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Abstract
Business failure research has been the focus of renewed interest in the
entrepreneurship field. It is complex, being both a sign of economic
vibrancy and the source of great individual trauma. An understand-
ing of these complexities is important to academics, practitioners and
regulators. This monograph provides a review of the literature to date.
It charts the emergence of business failure research in the finance lit-
erature through to its recent development within the contemporary
entrepreneurship field. The multidiscipline nature of business failure
research is explored through incorporation of studies from accoun-
tancy, information systems, social psychology, general management,
economics and entrepreneurship. Research on the topic is diverse; the
lack of a universally accepted definition of failure coupled with the
absence of an underpinning theory has resulted in an expansive range
of studies. The aim of this review is to provide a comprehensive and
critical review of business failure research, bridge the gap between the
various perspectives, and develop a cohesive understanding of the phe-
nomena, upon which future studies can be based.
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1
Introduction
Business failure research has its origins in the finance, when the estab-
lishment of commercial banks greatly increased the flow and spread of
financial information in the latter half of the nineteenth century [Hor-
rigan, 1968]. Since then it has been explored and studied by a range of
disciplines with researchers using disparate methodologies and various
lenses (see Beaver, 1966 — finance; Freeman et al., 1983 — sociology;
Dunne et al., 1989 — economics; Moulton et al., 1996 — management;
Yamakawa et al., 2015 — entrepreneurship). The most recent resur-
gence of interest in the subject has occurred in the past decade, with
a noticeable and sustaining increase in studies related to business fail-
ure emerging from the entrepreneurship literature [see Shepherd et al.,
2009b, Ucbasaran et al., 2010, Wennberg et al., 2010, Cope, 2011, Car-
don et al., 2011, Mantere et al., 2013, Jenkins et al., 2014, Wolfe and
Shepherd, 2015, Hsu et al., 2015]. The renewed interest on business
failure within the entrepreneurship domain has led to a focus on indi-
viduals’ experiences of failure [Franco and Haase, 2010, Simmons et al.,
2014, Byrne and Shepherd, 2015], thus departing from the compara-
tively detached approaches, such as analytical modelling, that were
commonplace when the topic first debuted in the finance literature.
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Interest in the topic has enriched the entrepreneurship literature and
led to a more nuanced understanding of business failure [Ucbasaran
et al., 2013, Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014]. However, there remain
issues within the field, gathering data on such a sensitive topic is diffi-
cult. Comparability between studies is further hindered by the lack of
a universally accepted definition; furthermore, the tendency amongst
researchers is to select their definition based on access to data rather
than scientific reasoning is concerning. This review aims to explore
these issues and provide a comprehensive overview of the evolution
of business failure research and key debates that have surrounded the
subject over the years within the entrepreneurship literature.
This literature review organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the
lack of a universally accepted definition of business failure, the difficul-
ties that arise from this, and the way in which this has directly con-
tributed to the limitations of quantitative studies. Furthermore, the
range of definitions employed by various studies within the literature
is examined in addition to the diverse methodological approaches. Sec-
tion 3 charts the emergence of failure studies in the business literature,
from their roots in financially driven bankruptcy prediction models to
the more encompassing organisational decline models. The monograph
also explores competing perspectives of business failure — determinis-
tic and voluntaristic. These two distinct schools of thought raise com-
pelling, albeit reductionist arguments in their exploration of the drivers
of business failure.
Section 4 provides a review of the extant literature on business fail-
ure in the entrepreneurship field. The focus is on the areas of enquiry
that have, thus far, dominated literature in the area. The section exam-
ines the body of knowledge on causes of, learning from, and psycho-
logical effect of failure in the context of entrepreneurship. Additionally,
the literature pertaining to emotions and failure as well as recovery
from failure are discussed and popular theories that accompany these
subjects are considered. This section culminates in an overview of the
methodological approaches that are more commonly seen in the recent
literature and then discusses the way in which these approaches are
comparable to previous research methods. The later part of the review
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is comprised of Section 5 where an overview of the limitations of cur-
rent approaches to the study of business failure is presented; partic-
ular focus is given to the issues that arise from retrospective biases.
Finally, Section 6 explores the future of the research topic within the
entrepreneurship literature. The monograph concludes with a summary
of the key arguments presented and an iteration of the importance, for
both theory and practice, of sustaining and advancing business failure
research.
2
Definitions and Concepts
The concept of business failure has ignited interest from various
researchers across the business and management spectrum, from
economists to accountants and entrepreneurs to organisational theo-
rists. However, a uniting obstacle faced by these fields stems from the
lack of a universally accepted definition of business failure. Scholars
from various fields have failed to converge on a unifying definition and
even within fields there is discord as “no two experts agree on a def-
inition of business failure” [Bruno and Leidecker, 1988, p. 51]. The
various interpretations of business failure within the literature are best
described as shifting goals whereby the range of the dataset either con-
tracts or expands depending on a given academics perception of failure
[Cochran, 1981, Bates, 2005]. The impact of the definitional deficit is
twofold. First the scope of the definition utilised in any given study
will have a substantial impact on the resulting rate of failure detected,
thus hindering comparisons across datasets [Cochran, 1981, Watson
and Everett, 1996]. Secondly, definition choice influences the outcomes
and processes that are observed, therefore a variety of definitions fur-
ther extend the chasm between studies [Ucbasaran et al., 2013]. The
range of definitions is explored in greater detail in the following section.
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2.1 Review of existing definitions and their implications
Business failure is a topic that has piqued the interest of scholars from
various business disciplines; in turn it has garnered a variety of defini-
tions over the decades. Cochran [1981] drew attention to the expanding
and contracting nature of various business failure definitions ranging
from the dysfunctional broad to the acutely narrow. At one end of the
spectrum is the definition of failure as bankruptcy. A firm may cease
to exist as a legal entity through either voluntary or compulsory liq-
uidation. In certain circumstances dissolving the firm earlier through
voluntary liquidation can stem further financial loss. However, firms
may also pursue voluntary liquidation for wholly positive reasons such
as acquisitions, mergers, or retirement. Thus, when examining the legal
cessation of a firm from a business failure perspective, compulsory liq-
uidation is most appropriate, as a court order forces the liquidation of
the firm. Insolvency is not the sole prerequisite for compulsory liqui-
dation; inequity and injustice are also grounds for such a legal action
[Sheehan, 2014]. Bankrupt firms provide precision and ease of identi-
fication as they have been subjected to a legal process that is held on
record; it is thus a tempting definition to employ in business failure
studies [Cochran, 1981]. However, the narrow scope of bankruptcy as
a definition leads to a reductive focus on a small subset of business
failures. The definition excludes other signals of a failing business such
as the business not providing a reasonable rate of return for the own-
ers/investors [Ucbasaran et al., 2013]. Furthermore, bankruptcy laws
differ across regions thus clouding the comparability of studies in vari-
ous legislative districts.
On the opposing end of the spectrum the broadest of definitions
posited by Cochran [1981] is discontinuance. Fredland and Morris [1976]
argue that discontinuance can be utilised as a proxy for failure, as dis-
continuance suggests that resources have been shifted to a more prof-
itable project. However, discontinuance of ownership includes firms that
are sold due to the owner wanting to retire, firms sold for a profit,
and firms sold simply because the owner wants to move on to another
venture [Watson and Everett, 1996]. Assuming discontinuance is a syn-
onym for failure is myopic and unreasonable [Khelil, 2016; Wennberg
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and DeTienne, 2014; Justo et al., 2015] Furthermore, it is the inclusion
of these entities that skew and inflate the failure statistics. Additional
difficulties arise from the fact that there are multiple variations of
discontinuance, some classify discontinuance of ownership whilst oth-
ers use discontinuance of the business [Watson and Everett, 1996].
Although discontinuance lacks the clear-cut nature of bankruptcy it is
possible to identify, with relative ease, a dataset of discontinued firms.
However, a complication in the treatment of small firms occurs in the
area of ownership transfers. Transfers of ownership by corporations are
treated differently from transfers of ownership by partnerships or sole
traders [Watson and Everett, 1996]. When a partnership or sole trader
sells his or her business or changes the business’s format it is gener-
ally regarded as a discontinuance of one business and the start-up of
another whereas the transfer of shares in a firm is generally not treated
as a business discontinuance [Watson and Everett, 1996]. Thus part-
nerships and sole traders are perceived to discontinue more frequently
than comparable corporate entities [Watson and Everett, 1996], thereby
promoting skewed statistics through the inconsistency of treatment.
Discontinuance of a firm for any reason and formal bankruptcy
proceedings are referred to as a “surrogate measure of failure” [Watson
and Everett, 1996, p. 47]. Despite being on opposing ends of the scale
with regard to definitional scope they are both identifiable and specific;
however, one is excessively narrow (bankruptcy) whilst the other exces-
sively broad (discontinuance); as such many other definitions of busi-
ness failure have been utilised and proposed over the years. Although
they may not offer the same ease of dataset identification, they offer
an insight into business failure from a range of lens as researchers from
different disciplines approach the topic from their respective areas of
specialism, resulting in a vibrant array of business failure definitions.
This has led to many interesting perspectives on business failure, how-
ever a major downside comes from the fact that the studies are, in
many cases, incomparable as they engage vastly different definitions
and conceptualisations [Jenkins and McKelvie, 2016]. As previously
mentioned compulsory liquidation is considered the legal definition of
business failure. It enacts a legal process that normally culminates in
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the obsolescence of a business. This contrasts with the accounting per-
spective on failure whereby failure is described as “wanting or needing
to sell or liquidate to avoid losses or to pay off creditors or general
inability to make a profitable go of the business” [Gaskill et al., 1993,
p. 18]. Whilst both are viable and reasonable definitions of failure, the
academic lens the researcher examines the concept through, heavily
influences each. Both perspectives involve liquidating assets and com-
pensating creditors (where possible), however the same process can be
explored through an entirely legal lens, or a wholly financial lens. Thus
whilst broadly the same process is under scrutiny, the results from the
diverse perspectives may be incomparable. Whilst viewing the phenom-
ena from diverse perspectives enriches understanding, it also increases
the complexity of consolidating research on the phenomena as it incor-
porates many different facets from an array of subject areas.
The economist perspective also offers a varying view of failure
whereby “failure” is regarded as a business that earned a rate of return
on investment which did not sufficiently cover the opportunity costs
[Fredland and Morris, 1976]. In this instance the firm does not strictly
need to dissolve in order to fulfill the definition, it simply needs to be
less fruitful than the alternative opportunities available at the time of
investment. However examining this definition from an entrepreneurial
perspective makes it less compelling as many business owners trade off
reduced profits in order to gain less tangible, immeasurable, rewards
such as increased market share, independence and personal satisfaction
[Benz, 2009]. Entrepreneurship is not solely a profit-seeking activity; as
such the economist’s definition of failure is somewhat limiting, as it does
not account for the intangible benefits of firm ownership. In line with
the economist approach Cardon et al. [2005, p. 300] put forth another
definition whereby failure is regarded as “a deviation from expected
and desired results”. This is an all-encompassing definition loaded with
an imprecision which allows almost every firm in existence to fit into its
realm in some aspect. The strategic management perspective has also
evolved with Sheppard and Chowdhury [2005, p. 240] defining failure
as “the misalignment of the organization to the environment’s reali-
ties”. Also under the strategic management umbrella Cochran [1981,
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p. 52] puts forth the definition of failure as an inability “to make a go
of it”, regardless of whether losses include capital or not. Furthermore
the definition termination to prevent further losses can be regarded as
a strategic response to stem to the flow of loss following a period of
difficulty. However engaging the definition requires further exploratory
research in order to determine a dataset [Ulmer and Nielsen, 1947].
However losses can stem from financial debt but also from reputational
damage and the loss of time invested, to name but a few. Therefore
depending on one’s interpretation, this definition can invoke different
meanings from different researchers. From an organizational viewpoint
discontinuance may be regarded as a proxy for failure as the firm is
either discontinued or the owner ceases to continue with the organiza-
tion. Further organizational perspectives of failure consider the broader
context within which the firm is operating. Freeman et al. [1983, p. 694]
regard failure as occurring when a firm “ceases to carry out the rou-
tine actions that sustain its structure, maintain flows of resources, and
retain the allegiance of its members”. In a more general sense Sharma
and Mahajan [1980, p. 82] label a firm a failure “if it cannot meet one
or more of its responsibilities”.
In recent years the discussion on business failure definitions has con-
tinued to evolve and the debate has become more nuanced. Coad [2014]
has criticized the term ‘failure’ as a pejorative word that negates the
prior existence of a firm as a futile exercise, given its ultimate demise.
Instead the word ‘death’ is presented as a more suitable term as it
encompasses both involuntary exits such as bankruptcies and volun-
tary exits such as retirement liquidations [Coad, 2014]. Hoetker and
Agarwal [2007] also embraced the word death to describe business exit.
However it is necessary to understand that “exit and failure are two
distinct concepts” [Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014, p. 9; Knott and
Posen, 2005] yet despite their differences it is “difficult to differen-
tiate voluntary closure from failure” [Shepherd and Wiklund, 2006].
Studies based on representative samples from US [Bates, 2005, Headd,
2003] and UK entrepreneurs [Ucbasaran et al., 2006] found that one-
third considered their firm successful when exiting. According to Headd
[2003] it is the lack of distinction between business closure and business
172 Definitions and Concepts
failure that is inflating failure statistics as some studies [Bates, 1990,
1995, Holmes and Schmitz, 1996, Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2003] directly
relate business exits with failure regardless of the underlying reasons
for discontinuance. Given the oscillating nature of business failure defi-
nitions, voluntary exits tend to get integrated with failures; the degree
to which this occurs depends on the scope of the definition used. Many
studies have used exit as a proxy for failure [Strotmann, 2007]. Yet
an exit strategy that allows the owner to close or sell their business
whilst it is still profitable is positive and so should not be categorized
as failure [Headd, 2003].
One of the more popular definitions of business failure gaining
momentum within the entrepreneurship literature characterizes fail-
ure as “the cessation of involvement in a venture because it has not
met a minimum threshold for economic viability as stipulated by
the entrepreneur” Ucbasaran et al. [2013, p. 175]. It is broad and
comprehensive, however it explores failure from the entrepreneurship
perspective and as such it is the entrepreneur’s expectations of eco-
nomic viability that dictates their fulfillment of the definition. Addi-
tionally, further obstacles arise when considering small businesses and
entrepreneurial firms. First, small firms are not subjected to the same
rigorous, formal reporting requirements as large companies [Watson
and Everett, 1996]. Often times SMEs engage informal reporting mech-
anisms, such as face-to-face interaction with stakeholders as opposed to
formal written accounts [Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013]. Thus obtaining
adequate, comparative, timely and reliable information on small firms
to assess economic performance is, in most cases, not possible. Sec-
ondly, small company accounts generally lack of a system of internal
control, thus making independent confirmation of figures presented in
the accounts problematic [Keasey and Watson, 1987]. Thirdly a time
lag often occurs when small companies draw up their accounts [Luy-
paert et al., 2015], this delay further hinders the relevance of the infor-
mation as a useful tool to determine the health of a firm [Keasey and
Watson, 1987]. Ultimately, when it comes to business failure definitions
many researchers are guided to the most appropriate failure definition
based on the dataset available rather than vice versa, so a trade-off
2.1. Review of existing definitions and their implications 173
exists between ease of access to a dataset and an appropriate defini-
tion of business failure. This further blurs the lines and hinders the
reliability of studies contributing to being incongruent statistics and
incomparable research studies.
Recently, further efforts within the entrepreneurship literature to
clarify the concept of failure have led to an exploration of the differences
between failure and exit [Bates, 2005, Headd, 2003, Wennberg et al.,
2010]. Although exit is multilevel in nature (it may refer to the exit of
firms from the market or the exit of founders from their firms), it is a
“measurable event that can be easily captured empirically” DeTienne
et al. [2015, p. 257]. A recent paper by Khelil [2016] argued for exit to be
engaged as a base concept that is then built upon with three specific
configurations as a means of further synthesizing the phenomena of
failure. These configurations being: (1) exit caused by the new venture’s
economic failure, (2) exit caused by the entrepreneur’s disappointment
and (3) exit to avoid failure [Khelil, 2016]. Clearly it is easier to identify
exit as opposed to failure, and whilst exit as a proxy for failure is not
acceptable, it does offer an opportunity to establish a dataset from
which to start an investigation into the complex topic of failure.
Table 2.1 provides a general overview of key business failure defini-
tions from various fields.
In summary the general consensus in the literature is that the lack
of a uniform definition is hindering our understanding of the phenom-
ena [Pretorius, 2009, Watson and Everett, 1998, 1996, Cochran, 1981],
and this remains an obstacle for development of the topic within the
entrepreneurship literature. It has led to the inclusion of firms that
change ownership, geographical location or legal structure in the busi-
ness failure statistics. These practices further hinder the viability of
international empirical comparisons and the progression of the busi-
ness failure literature as a whole. Each definition has its respective
merits and according to Ucbasaran et al. [2013] the researcher’s choice
of definition should be guided by the study’s research question. How-
ever many failure traits are not visible or measurable on a large scale
but are more tacit, instinctive and subjective and therefore require a
deeper investigation into the firms in question before they can even
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Table 2.1: Definitions of business failure from various perspectives.
Academic
perspective Definition Advantages Disadvantages
Accounting “wanting or needing to sell
or liquidate to avoid losses
or to pay off creditors or
general inability to make a
profitable go of the business”
[Gaskill et al., 1993, p. 18]
• Clear
• Focused
• Specific
• Requires further
analysis to identify
Legal Bankruptcy through
compulsory liquidation:
“companies are placed into
insolvency after a successful
petition to the Court by a
creditor of the company”
[Cuthbertson and Hudson,
1996, p. 298].
• Clear
• Focused
• Specific
• Identifiable
• Accessible
• Restrictive
• Narrow
Economic “deviation from expected
and desired results” [Cannon
and Edmondson, 2005,
p. 300]
• Broad
• Specific
• Excessively broad
• Requires further
analysis to identify
• Subjective
Failures as opportunity costs
[Cochran, 1981]
• Specific
• Broad
• Requires further
analysis to identify
Strategic Termination to prevent
further losses [Ulmer and
Nielsen, 1947]
• Specific
• Identifiable
• Narrow
“failure is the misalignment
of the organisation to the
environment’s realities”
[Sheppard and Chowdhury,
2005, p. 240]
• Broad • Requires further
analysis to identify
• Subjective
failure to “make a go of it”
[Cochran, 1981, p. 52]
• Broad
• Allows
subjectivity of
individual
involved
• Requires further
analysis to identify
• Subjective
(Continued)
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Table 2.1: (Continued)
Academic
perspective Definition Advantages Disadvantages
Organisational Discontinuance
[Ulmer and Nielsen,
1947] “ceases to carry
out the routine
actions that sustain
its structure, maintain
flows of resources, and
retain the allegiance
of its members”
[Freeman et al., 1983,
p. 694].
• Identifiable
• Broad
• Not necessarily
solely failure
• Requires further
analysis to identify
• Subjective
“a firm may be
regarded as a failure if
it cannot meet one or
more of its
responsibilities”
[Sharma and
Mahajan, 1980, p. 82]
• Specific • Requires further
analysis to identify
dataset
• Subjective
Entrepreneurship “the cessation of
involvement in a
venture because it has
not met a minimum
threshold for economic
viability as stipulated
by the entrepreneur”
[Ucbasaran et al.,
2013, p. 175].
• Broad
• Allows subjectivity
of individual
involved
• Requires further
analysis to identify
• Subjective
be classified by definition. In fact to fully understand which definition
is most applicable to each individual failure case, an in-depth qualita-
tive research approach can be beneficial, yet such an approach also has
obvious drawbacks.
Definition choice is a crucial element to any study of business
failure as variances in the level of failure detected ranges from a
peak of 71% to a low of 31% in the first five years of life depend-
ing on the definition employed [Watson and Everett, 1996]. Table 2.2
presents the various studies examining types of exit. The studies high-
light both the diversity of exit and the way in which use of certain
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Table 2.2: Failure versus exit explored.
Author Study Outcomes in Percentage Terms
Wennberg et al.
[2010]
Analysis of 1,735
independent start-up
firms based in Sweden.
The firms were all
started in 1995 and
tracked until 2002
• Remained in business
• Harvest liquidation
• Distress liquidation
• Harvest sale
• Distress sale
34%
26%
25%
8%
6%
Gimeno et al.
[1997]
Study explored 3,615
entrepreneurs with
new businesses in the
USA, they were
tracked for 3 years
(1985–1987)
• Remained in business
• Discontinued
• Sold
• Did not respond to the final
survey and were not
identified as discontinued or
sold
26%
17%
5%
52%
Headd [2003] Examines new
employer firms’ census
datasets from the
USA. Results are after
4 years of start-up
• Closed and successful
• Closed and unsuccessful
• Still operating
17%
33%
50%
Ronstadt [1986] Analysis of
questionnaire data
from the USA on 95
former entrepreneurs
that were Babson
College alumni
• Selling out
• Liquidation
• Bankruptcies
• Unclear
46%
43%
5%
5%
Harada [2007] Examined reasons for
exit amongst 1,743
small Japanese firms
• Economic forced exita
• Non-economic forced exit
39.7%
60.3%
Balcaen et al.
[2012]
Analysis of 6,118
mature firm
distress-related exits
in Belgium
• Court-driven exit (mainly
bankruptcy)
• Voluntarily liquidated
• Merger and Acquisition
41%
44%
14%
Tavares
Machado [2014]
Study tracks the exit
strategies of
Portuguese 35,135
start-ups and 45,086
founders over the
period of 2004 to 2009
• Continuation
• Distress liquidation
• Voluntary liquidation
• Distress sale
• Voluntary sale
65%
11%
5%
14%
5%
(Continued)
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Table 2.2: (Continued)
Author Study Outcomes in Percentage Terms
Watson and
Everett [1996]
Focused on 5,196
young Australian
businesses over
30-year period
operating in shopping
centres. Examined
reasons for sale or
closure based on
various definitions
• Bankruptcy
• To prevent further
losses
• Failed to make a go of
it
• Discontinuance of
ownership
• Discontinuance of
business
7%
23%
42%
100%
39%b
obos and
Szewczyk [2012]
Data from Poland
showed of 275,300
firms started in 2009
the percentage still
active at the end of
2010
• Still active
• Inactive
77%
23%
a Bankruptcies accounted for only 2%.
b Is not adding up to 100% as when the definition broadens in scope it incorporates previous
outcomes. E.g. “to prevent further losses” also includes “bankruptcy” figures.
definitions of failure can inflate the statistics [see Watson and Everett,
1996, study]. Furthermore the terminology used in the studies is, for
the most part, clear and identifiable, yet it differs greatly from the
definitions of business failure discussed earlier, which are more subjec-
tive. This divergence illustrates the misalignment between the practical
observation of failure and exit, and the conceptualisations of failure put
forth in the literature.
Contemporary entrepreneurship literature has been instrumen-
tal in postulating the need for a distinction between failure and
exit [Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014, Coad, 2014]. The focus of
entrepreneurship research on the individual actor allows for a more
nuanced differentiation between failure and exit than large-scale, quan-
titative studies can currently provide.
3
The Emergence of Failure Studies in the
Business Literature
Research on business failure traces back to the late 1800s when the
establishment of commercial banks greatly increased the flow and
spread of financial information [Horrigan, 1968]. This availability finan-
cial data was the genesis of business failure studies. Early studies pri-
marily focused on financial and accounting measures and subsequently
the topic spread into economics, information systems, general manage-
ment, sociology and entrepreneurship. This section explores the emerg-
ing failure studies that contributed to shaping the contemporary failure
literature.
3.1 Bankruptcy prediction models
In the 1930s the great depression formed the catalyst that led to the
study of business failure to begin in earnest. Access to financial data
allowed for tentative links and relationships to be made between various
items within financial statements. Studies identified that failing com-
panies display considerably different ratio measurements to continuing
businesses [Fitzpatrick, 1932, Smith and Winakor, 1935, Merwin, 1942].
This led to the creation of bankruptcy prediction models; most models
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were created using a paired-sample technique. That is, one sample con-
sisting of data pertinent to failed firms (e.g. debt level, cash liquidity
rate) and a paired sample comprising of continuing firms with contem-
poraneous data. The results determine which financial attributes are
consistent and/or which are significantly different between the viable
firms and failed firms. The goal of this technique is to identify a for-
mula, “based either on a single ratio or a combination of ratios, that
best discriminates between firms that eventually failed and firms that
remained solvent” [Scott, 1981, p. 320]. The development of an empiri-
cal foundation of ratio analysis that these early studies created, paved
the way for the more sophisticated studies that came to the fore in
the late 1960s. It was the seminal works of Beaver [1966] and Altman
[1968] that ignited profound new interest in prediction modelling as a
means of determining corporate distress.
Beaver’s [1966] pioneering research presented a financial ratio model
in the form of univariate discriminate analysis. This model utilised
three important ratios, namely, cash flow to total debt, net income to
total assets and total debt to total assets, through a dichotomous clas-
sification test. Engaging these ratios individually had the propensity
to flag struggling firms for as long as 5 years prior to failure ensu-
ing [Altman, 1993, Cahill, 1997]. Subsequently Altman [1968], building
on the foundations laid by Beaver [1966], employed the multivariate
discriminate analysis technique — “a statistical technique used to clas-
sify an observation into one of several a priori groupings dependent
upon the observation’s individual characteristics . . . in its most simple
form (it) attempts to derive a linear combination of these character-
istics which ‘best’ discriminates between groups” [Altman, 1993, p.
182]. Altman’s multivariate discriminant analysis produced a set of
ratios that combined to determine a ‘Z score’. An enhanced version
later became known as the Zeta analysis model ([Altman et al., 1977]
dominated the literature on business failure prediction until the 1980s
[Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006]. Whilst multivariate discriminant analy-
sis is still a generally accepted method of analysis it has been largely
replaced by more straightforward techniques such as logit analysis, pro-
bit analysis and linear probability modelling. Logit analysis is the most
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popular of the three. Forged by Ohlson [1980] it claims greater accu-
racy in its predictive abilities as it combines various firm characteristics
into a multivariate probability score [Cahill, 1997]. However the non-
randomised approach of traditional failure prediction models may result
in inefficient predictions due to under-representation of particular types
of firms [Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006]. Improved econometric techniques
along with the increasing availability of data allowed bankruptcy pre-
diction techniques to grow during the 1980s and 1990s [Lee and Choi,
2013]. Prediction models are still widely used today and technology
advances in recent decades have allowed for increasingly complex algo-
rithms to develop into sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) mod-
els [Camacho-Miñano et al., 2015]. AI models have been applied to
bankruptcy prediction since the 1990s, however it, alongside all previ-
ous models they are not without criticism. An overview of the main
bankruptcy prediction models is presented in Table 3.1.
3.1.1 Suitability of prediction modelling
in contemporary research
Although prediction modelling remains a major research field within
corporate finance [Sun et al., 2014, Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006] sev-
eral forces have affected the appropriateness of predictive models in
recent years. First the increase in the relative importance of intangible
assets and financial derivatives in recent decades are items not ade-
quately captured by extant financial ratios. Given that such assets can
be important commodities this omission constitutes potentially impor-
tant variables. Secondly a perceived increase in the degree of discretion
used when entering financial statements [Beaver et al., 2005] has the
potential to either enhance or impair prediction precision. On one side
financial statements may be informed by significant private informa-
tion known only to the company’s internal management, conversely
internal discretion could be utilised to obscure important aspects of
a firm’s financial performance. A look back at recent years can attest
that this opportunistic behavior is not uncommon [Bisogno and Luca,
2015, Beaver et al., 2005, Fich and Slezak, 2008, Rosner, 2003]. There
is a perception that discretion in reported financial statement amounts
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Table 3.1: Bankruptcy prediction models.
Bankruptcy
prediction model Basic premise Key authors
Univariate
analysis
The univariate logistic approach evaluates
the predictive ability of each variable for 1, 2
and 3 years prior to failure occurring. It is an
extremely simple technique based on a
stringent assumption of a linear relationship
between all measures and the failure status
[Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006].
Beaver [1966]
Appetiti [1984]
Risk Index
Models
Risk Index Models are a simple ‘point’s
system’ that includes ratios as a measure of
financial health. A certain number of points
(between 0 and 100) are attributed to a firm
based on the firm’s ratios. The greater the
points total the better the firm’s financial
situation.
Tamari [1966]
Moses and Liao [1987]
Multivariate
discriminate
analysis (MDA)
MDA classifies firms into mutually exclusive
groups, either failing or non-failing based on
a combination of independent financial
ratios. MDA is a progression of univariate
analysis.
Altman [1968]
Altman et al. [1977]
Deakin [1972]
Ooghe and Verbaere
[1985]
Altman et al. [1995]
Logit Model (LA) The LA gives a probability of bankruptcy in
percentage terms. It combines several
characteristics into a probability score for
each firm. Firms are then assigned to a
failing or non-failing group based on their
logit scores.
Martin [1997]
Ohlson [1980]
Aziz et al. [1988]
Luoma and Laitinen
[1991]
Andersen [2008]
Probit Model
(PA)
The PA is closely related to the LA however
probit estimation requires the likelihood
function to be weighted; therefore the sample
proportion of bankrupt companies is
approximately equal to the population
proportion [Lennox, 1999].
Zmijewski [1984]
Gloubos and
Grammatikos [1988]
Skogsvik [1990]
Theodossiou [1991]
Hazard Model Harzard Models generate probabilities of
failure within a predetermined interval.
Cox [1972]
Lane et al. [1986]
Beaver et al. [2005]
Arena [2008]
Artificial
Intelligence
Expert Systems
(AIES)
Intelligent systems are constructed using the
human expert approach (entering human
knowledge into a computer) or
machine-learning approach (generating
knowledge through data analysis). AIES
include decision tree, fuzzy set theory,
case-based reasoning, genetic algorithm,
support vector machine and neural networks
and most recently extreme machine learning.
Coats and Fant [1993]
Bell [1997]
Boritz et al. [1995]
Fanning and Cogger
[1994]
Camacho-Miñano et al.
[2015]
Yu et al. [2014]
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has substantially increased over time although it is uncertain if this is
due to an actual increase or simply that cases of discretion have become
better documented in recent years. However studies by Beaver et al.
[2005] and Fich and Slezak [2008] are consistent with the view that
deterioration in the predictive ability of financial ratios is primarily
due to increased discretion.
The utilisation of the linear classification rule, the use of annual
account information and the neglect of the multifaceted nature of fail-
ure also hinder the predictive ability of classical models [Balcaen and
Ooghe, 2006]. The assumption of linearity exists in univariate corporate
failure prediction models so if a firm’s value for a certain predictor is
lower than a particular cut-off point this signals weak financial health,
and vice versa [Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006]. However this assumption
is often violated as some variables indicate financial problems when
the variable’s value is very low or very high [Keasey and Watson,
1991]. Furthermore evidence highlights that unhealthy firms are incen-
tivised to manipulate their annual accounts using creative accounting
practices; this activity is particularly prevalent when failure is immi-
nent [see Argenti, 1976, Ooghe et al., 1995, Charitou and Lambertides,
2003, Rosner, 2003]. A distain for failure can “lead to behavior that
seeks to avoid failure unscrupulously” [McGrath, 1999, p. 20]. Addi-
tionally annual accounts may be particularly unreliable for smaller
firms due to the lack of an internal control system [Keasey and Wat-
son, 1987]. Auditors may make annual account adjustments in light of
a bankruptcy filing, commonly referred to as ‘accommodated’ annual
accounts [Charitou and Lambertides, 2003]. Thus unreliable account-
ing information results in failure prediction models based on distorted
financial ratios thus limiting their usefulness and application [Balcaen
and Ooghe, 2006]). Furthermore failure prediction models based on
annual accounts implicitly assume that all relevant success and failure
indicators are reflected in the annual accounts however this is sim-
ply not the case [Argenti, 1976, Zavgren, 1985, Maltz et al., 2003].
Argenti [1976, p. 138] stated that, “while ratios may show that there
is something wrong. . . I doubt whether one would dare to predict col-
lapse or failure on the evidence of these ratios alone”. Furthermore
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Zavgren [1985, p. 22–23] bolstered the argument by postulating that,
“any econometric model containing only financial statement informa-
tion will not predict with certainty the failure or non-failure of a firm”.
Currently, Artificial Intelligence Expert Systems (AIES) are popular,
however these too have problems, including “strict hypothesis, poor
generalization ability, low prediction accuracy and low learning rate,
(and) slow computational time” [Yu et al., 2014, p. 296]. Furthermore
transparency is an issue for some expert systems. Particularly, neural
network models and vector machines [Olson et al., 2012] where only the
final results are available; known as ‘black box’ representations. Mean-
while decision tree models generate too many rules [Olson et al., 2012].
Rules provide transparency as they show the basis for the model’s pre-
dictions. The number of rules can be controlled to a degree, by setting
different minimum support levels [Olson et al., 2012]. However when
the tree is deeper it requires increasingly complex decision rules, this
in turn leads to a fitter model and a tree-like network of relationships
and interactions. Thus whilst decision rules increase a model’s ability it
also increases “the complexity involved for human application” [Olson
et al., 2012, p. 470].
Unsurprisingly, there is “no academic consensus as to the most use-
ful method for predicting corporate bankruptcy” [Aziz and Dar, 2006].
Whilst prediction models provide insightful data they do not negate
the need for exploration of the human and managerial side of firms
[Yazdipour and Constand, 2010]. At the height of business prediction
models popularity, Storey et al. [1987] indicated that qualitative studies
can be at least as good as financial prediction models at pre-empting
firm failure. Whilst prediction models have continued to advance and
improve over the years, so too have non-finance-based approaches. The
following section will explore organisational decline models.
3.2 Organisational decline models
Rather than focusing on predictive techniques through financial data,
organisational decline models are concerned with understanding the
process of business failure. The late 1980s saw a surge in organisational
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decline studies [Adler and Chaston, 2002]. In later years life-cycle the-
ory captured the concept of a business progressing through distin-
guishable, predictable stages [Cahill, 1997]. The theory presents five
distinct stages that an organisation progresses through, namely ‘birth’,
‘growth’, ‘maturity’, ‘decline/revival’ and ‘death’. However not all firms
progress sequentially through the stages nor do they spend an equal
amount of time in each stage [Cahill, 1997]. Organisational decline
models focus on the final two stages of the lifecycle in an attempt
to better understand the failure phenomenon. If the phases of failure
can be identified and remedied in time then catastrophic failures can be
avoided [Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989, Cannon and Edmondson, 2005].
In the literature the process of business failure has been referred to
as “trajectories of corporate collapse” [Argenti, 1976], “downward spi-
ral” Hambrick and D’Aveni [1988], “failure syndromes” [Miller, 1977,
p. 43], and “failure pathways” [Moulton et al., 1996, p. 573]. The term
‘process’ aims to establish a chronological order to the evolution of
failure. In some cases this results in the employment of typologies and
categorisations to chart the progression of failure. In this section vari-
ous decline models and failure process models are explored in greater
detail.
One of the first researchers to examine the dynamic nature of failure
was Argenti [1976]. Upon seeing the need for “a storyline that binds
together all these causes and symptoms into a working model”, a study
that related non-financial failure causes with financial indicators was
developed [Argenti, 1976, p. 121]. The research consolidated the notion
of ‘failure as a process’ and ‘failure as an outcome with distinctive,
identifiable patterns’. The seminal study developed three failure tra-
jectory models and archetypical process stories that encapsulated the
basic sequence of events that started each firm on its respective failure
trajectory [Argenti, 1976, p. 121]. This set the foundation for a hand-
ful of studies that endeavoured to formulate the ultimate trajectory,
pathway and/or pattern of failure [Miller, 1977, Sharma and Maha-
jan, 1980, Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988, D’Aveni, 1989, Weitzel and
Jonsson, 1989, Miller, 1992, Richardson et al., 1994, Moulton et al.,
1996, Mellahi, 2005]. However over a decade later D’Aveni [1989] noted
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that Argenti’s findings were still awaiting confirmation and further
explanation. Whilst in later years [Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008, p.
226] noted to date “few researchers have explicitly analysed failure
as a process”. The reasons scholars have shied away from studies into
business failure include: the negative connotations associated with the
concept of failure, the idea that each firm’s failure process is atypical
and hence not suitable for scientific study, a lack of a systematic body
of knowledge on the failure process and a belief that failure is a sudden
unforeseeable occurrence rather than a gradual process [Sharma and
Mahajan, 1980]. Despite Argenti’s [1976] seminal research “the exis-
tence of specific errors in different failure paths and within distinctive
phases is not clear” and the subtleties of the various failure trajecto-
ries are not sufficiently apparent [Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008, p. 226].
Research in the 2000s began to provide a fuller picture of failure as they
consolidate the ‘why’ and ‘how’ into their models provide increased
insight and knowledge into the complexities of business failure [Shep-
pard and Chowdhury, 2005, Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008]. Until these
studies many models examining organisational decline were primarily
derived from literature reviews [Weitzel and Jonsson, 1989, Richard-
son et al., 1994] and already available public data (e.g. bankruptcy
documents/reports), such models are detailed in Table 3.2.
The models depicted in Table 3.2 are based on existing data
in the form of financial accounts, sales data, historical economic
records, bankruptcy cases, existing case studies and existing inves-
tigative reports. Whilst this data is comprehensive and informative
it imposes restrictive constraints on the researchers as they can only
work with the information available. According to Ooghe and DePri-
jcker [2008] the boundaries of failure studies need to be pushed further
with researchers becoming explicit in their intentions. This coupled
with empirical research is required to develop both the failure literature
and studies usefulness to practitioners. Academic studies that include
primary data collection are limited but growing. Ooghe and DePrijcker
[2008] developed a Belgium-based study with a small sample of 12 com-
panies selected based on size, age and industry. Annual accounts and
court findings were utilised and a selection of interviews with multiple
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stakeholders was conducted [Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008]. A typology
of four types of failure processes were emergent from the analysis of
the case-study findings, namely:
(1) Failure process of an unsuccessful start-up
(2) Failure process of an ambitious growth company
(3) Failure process of a dazzled growth company
(4) Failure process of an apathetic established company
The failure process typologies are strongly related to company matu-
rity and management characteristics. It is viewed that these attributes
affect a company’s ability to attract finance and also management’s
ability to deal with environmental changes.
Chowdhury’s [2002] model mentioned in Table 3.2 was one of the
multiple frameworks derived from a literature analysis [Weitzel and
Jonsson, 1989, Richardson et al., 1994]. However the author’s proceed-
ing paper, Sheppard and Chowdhury [2005], did attempt to embed
the model in a degree of empiricism by testing it as a failure pro-
cess model. ‘T. Eaton Company Ltd.’, a once successful but ultimately
failed Canadian retail giant merchandising firm was the subject of this
study, its surviving counterparts Hudson’s Bay Company and Canadian
Tire were also examined as a means of depicting the model as a fail-
ure process model and illustrating how industry counterparts overcame
similar market pressures successfully. The four-stage model highlights
the sequential steps through which an organisation progresses through
before reaching organisational death, they posit that it is much easier
to halt failure during the first two stages: (1) decline and (2) response
initiation, through tactical measures than to reverse it during the last
two stages: (3) transition and (4) outcome, when it is deeper entrenched
[Sheppard and Chowdhury, 2005]. The authors view a firm’s manage-
ment, its environment and the way both the firm and environment
interact, as playing a key role in a company’s survival. As such it is
argued that unless the downfall of a firm can be attributed to “some
sudden, unexpected and extreme external shock” that could not have
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been foreseen, then it could have been avoided [Sheppard and Chowd-
hury, 2005, p. 241].
Some prominent researchers [Argenti, 1976, D’Aveni, 1989, Laiti-
nen, 1991] argue that not all firms enter a failure process for the same
reasons and they do not all approach the downward spiral the same
way as characteristics such as age, size, industry and flexibility influ-
ence a firm’s reactions [Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008]. Furthermore sev-
eral studies discuss the need to consider the technological level of the
industry [Acs and Audretsch, 1990, Poutziouris et al., 2000, Madrid-
Guijarro et al., 2011]. The failure process begins within a firm long
before it becomes apparent in the financial accounts. In fact deterio-
ration in the financial accounts is merely a translation of existing fun-
damental organisational problems that were left unaddressed [Weitzel
and Jonsson, 1989]. As Ooghe and DePrijcker [2008, p. 223] put it,
“company failure does not happen overnight”. This perspective of fail-
ure progressing through separate and predictable stages is taken a step
further by Mellahi [2005] with the concept of warning signals initiat-
ing the pre-failure stage, the signals indicate a forthcoming threat to
the company’s existence and if they are not spotted and appropriately
acted upon by management the firm will begin its journey through
the failure process culminating in the company’s collapse. Similarly,
Weitzel and Jonsson’s [1991] five-stage model of failure corroborates
the view that management inaction can decimate a firm during the ini-
tial stages of failure. A perspective offered by van Witteloostuijn (1998)
uses a Cournot duopoly model to explore decline through competitive
dynamics; it is argued that chronic failure is the result of organizational
inertia, strategic competition, and cost inefficiency. Organisational iner-
tia is potentially asymmetric; an increase in profitability is concomitant
with “an upward adjustment of sales, whereas a decline in profitability
is not associated with a downward adjustment of sales volume” (van
Witteloostuijn, 1998, p. 517). Furthermore, with regards to efficiency
the argument put forth by van Witteloostuijn (1998) posits that if
demand declines, efficient firms may decide to exit first whilst inefficient
firms stay in the market. And finally it is argued that strategic com-
petition may lead to chronic failure even when demand is favourable,
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if one or both rivals are driven by a sales motive (van Witteloostuijn,
1998).
3.2.1 The time dimension of failure
Organisational decline models illustrate that failure is unlikely to be
a sudden occurrence and more often is a direct result of a destructive
chain of unchecked events. Finding a solution for this chain of events is
time dependent — the sooner management realise what is going wrong
and take steps to fix the problem, the better the firm’s chances of sur-
vival. Identifying the onset of failure is particularly important when
changes in performance are gradual as ‘a serious response is never trig-
gered, or at least not until it is too late to respond’, a reactive approach
by management is not a good strategy to adopt when trying to com-
bat failure [Chowdhury and Lang, 1993, p. 9]. However the actions
management takes to remedy a situation will greatly depend on the
firm’s antecedent events or outcomes [Dillon and Tinsley, 2008]. When
changes in performance are gradual the required response from man-
agement to reverse the decline is seldom triggered; at least not until the
firm’s performance has dissipated to such a degree that even the most
effective action is unlikely to rescue the firm [Chowdhury and Lang,
1993]. Each stage of the failure process is characterised by different
symptoms however this is not adequately reflected by prediction mod-
els which assumes that all firms follow a uniform failure process [Ooghe
and DePrijcker, 2008, Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006]. It is for these reasons
that there has been a shift in focus towards qualitative methods as a
means of truly understanding business failure in recent years [Khelil,
2016, Cope, 2011, Singh et al., 2015, Byrne and Shepherd, 2015, Man-
tere et al., 2013]. For some businesses the progression of the process
towards failure is inevitable and irreversible; it occurs in spite of, or
indeed because of, an individual trying to reverse the downward spi-
ral towards closure [Cardon et al., 2005]. In such instances charting
the repercussions of the failure experience is insightful as different fail-
ure experiences can result in very different outcomes [Thorne, 2000,
Wiesenfeld et al., 2008]. The consequences of failure on the individual
are explored in greater depth later in this monograph.
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3.3 The internal/external debate
As research on business failure became more sophisticated the variety
of factors regarded as contributing to failure became increasingly com-
plex; typically they are divided into external factors and internal fac-
tors. External factors refer to causes in the environment whilst internal
factors pertain to causes within the firm. The debate stems around a
nature and nurture perspective similar to an embedded analogy within
the field of sociology. The analogy compares formal social systems, such
as organisations, with biological organisms [Katz and Kahn, 1966, Han-
nan and Freeman, 1977, Whittaker et al., 1973]. According to Ormerod
[2005] the fundamental difference between biological evolution and firm
evolution is that organisations are run by individuals ideally acting in a
strategic manner with the intention of becoming increasingly fit for sur-
vival, whereas the evolutionary process of the biological species cannot
be planned. At one end of the spectrum is a “full information, ratio-
nal maximising agent of conventional economics” and at the other is
an “agent possessed of no cognitive ability whatsoever, with no infor-
mation and no way to analyse it usefully” [Ormerod, 2005, p. 141].
Yet both organisational entities and biological species struggle against
extinction despite their divergent approaches to life. The term ‘milieu’
has been employed to refer to conditions external to an organisational
unit over which individuals in the unit have little control [Ulrich, 1987].
This contrasting approach to existence which usually, ultimately
ends in the same fate of extinction has ignited a debate in the field
of organisational management theory, whereby firms fail due to being
a victim of nurture (i.e. the ‘full information, rational maximising
agent of conventional economics’ makes poor decisions which ultimately
result in the downfall of the firm) or nature (i.e. the agent possessed
of ‘no cognitive ability whatsoever, with no information and no way to
analyse it usefully’ falls victim to its environment — Ormerod, 2005, p.
141). Whilst this example displays an overly simplistic view of the com-
peting schools of thought, it succeeds in communicating the expansive
spectrum of opinion. On one side there are classical industrial organisa-
tion (IO) and organisation ecology (OE) academics who assume a deter-
ministic role of the environment, basically arguing that it is exogenous
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factors which have the most effect on a firm’s chances of survival. Whilst
the organisational studies (OS) and organisational psychology (OP)
approach takes a voluntaristic outlook, whereby managers are the main
decision makers within a firm therefore their decisions and perceptions
greatly affect the firm and thus management is the fundamental cause
of firm collapse [Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004]. Each comprising differ-
ing assumptions and theories as detailed in Table 3.3, which depicts a
clear distinction between both the internal and external factors which
impact upon the performance of a firm [Kotha and Nair, 1995, Hansen
and Wernerfelt, 1989]. The deterministic approach will be discussed
further in the following section and then the voluntaristic approach
will be examined.
3.3.1 The deterministic school of thought
The deterministic perspective of business failure posits that industry
is more significant than the firm. Failure, according to determinists,
is “caused by external factors over which management has little or no
control” [Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004, p. 22]. The Industrial Organisa-
tion (IO) and Organizational Ecology (OE) school of thought are two
such perspectives that encapsulate the deterministic view.
3.3.1.1 Industrial organisation perspective
The IO perspective is grounded in economics. It is concerned with the
environmental conditions within which firms operate and also how firms
interact and behave in the marketplace. There is no internal approach
taken by the IO perspective as it is predominantly concerned with a
particular industry as a whole and also competitor’s interactions within
industry rather than individual outlooks. It is a perspective which is
“underpinned by the Schumpeterian thesis of creative destruction”,
whereby jolts in the external environment result in waves of organisa-
tional failure [Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004, p. 23; Schumpeter, 1942].
IO scholars have identified some interesting results to warrant serious
consideration of the perspective as a valid system for industrial studies.
It has been found that the “ranking of industries by concentration level
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Table 3.3: Voluntaristic and deterministic schools of thought.
Nature/deterministic Nurture/voluntaristic
Theoretical
origins
• Industrial Organisation
• Organisation Ecology
• Organisation Studies
• Organisational
Psychology
Premise Organisations are
embedded in their
environments therefore
external factors have
more explanatory power
than firm level factors.
Management has little or
no control over external
factors, thus causing
failure.
Who makes the decision
is regarded as being
more important than the
external context within
which the decision is
made.
Failure is linked to
internal inadequacies in
dealing with external
threats.
Failure is
caused by:
Demographic,
technological, regulatory
and economic changes.
Also changes in
consumer tastes, cyclical
decline in demand,
increased competition,
technological
uncertainty.
Management’s
perception of a situation,
their motivations,
feelings, and experiences
all influence whether
they respond to
organisational crises
appropriately or not.
Key authors Aldrich [1979], Boone
and van Witteloostuijn
[1995], Sutton [1991],
Hannan and Freeman
[1977]
Hambrick and Mason
[1984], Finkelstein
[2005], Ooghe and
DePrijcker [2008],
Hambrick [2007]
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tends to be closely similar from one country to another: an industry
that is dominated by a handful of firms in one country is likely to be
dominated by a handful of firms elsewhere too” [Sutton, 1991, p. 3].
Additionally a study by Dunne et al. [1988] highlighted that although
entry and exit patterns differ considerably across industries, a high
degree of correlation exists between entry and exit rates across indus-
tries and the variances in industry entry and exit patterns persist over
time. Thus it can be deduced from these findings “that substantial, sys-
tematic heterogeneity exists between organisational populations and
that some underlying characteristics of industries strongly constrain
equilibrium structures” [Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 1995, p. 276].
Three underlying assumptions reflect the IO perspective: First, the
external environment imposes pressure and constraints on firms’ strate-
gies, which can lead to failure. Secondly, it is assumed that a similar
strategy is pursued by most firms operating in the same industry, or
within a certain segment of the industry. Thirdly, decision makers in
organisations are assumed to be rational agents acting in the firms’
best interests and thus failure could not be caused by them alone [Mel-
lahi and Wilkinson, 2004, Arthurs et al., 2008]. According to the IO
literature the primary causes of business failure stem from changes in
consumer tastes, cyclical demand declines, increased competitive forces
and turbulent demand structures due to low switching barriers for core
customers [Baum and Singh, 1994, Sheppard, 1995, Mellahi andWilkin-
son, 2004]. Other factors cited as influencing the lifespan of firms result
from factors such as technological change, economic change, regulatory
change and demographic change [Scott, 1992, Anderson and Tushman,
2001]. In recent years technological uncertainty is a prominent concern
for many industries, it is at its height when one technological regime
replaces another, yet it is unclear which variant of the new technology
will become the industry’s accepted norm [Tushman and Rosenkopf,
1992, Anderson and Tushman, 2001]. Technological change has the
power to overturn existing industry structures and in keeping with
Schumpeterian tradition interims of intensive change and technologi-
cal progress alternate with periods of relative stability and incremental
advance [Anderson and Tushman, 2001].
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The relationship between organisations and the environment can
be explained by three factors: munificence, complexity and dynamism
[Dess and Beard, 1984]. Munificence refers to the availability of
resources and complexity pertains to the complex linkages both within
a firm and between a firm and its external networks [Dess and
Beard, 1984]. IO scholars suggest an adverse relationship between the
availability of resources and the organisational mortality rates and a
positive correlation between environmental complexity and the organ-
isational mortality rate [Anderson and Tushman, 2001]. Dynamism
refers to unpredictability and an absence of pattern, it is an uncer-
tainty that results in the “inability to predict or foresee” [Anderson
and Tushman, 2001, p. 683]. In unpredictable environments success
can be fragile rather than enduring and a higher proportion of firms
survive because they are lucky, not because they are good [Barnett
and Hansen, 1996]. Learning curves are shallower and the turbulence
may lead to entrepreneurs revising their expectations, consequently this
may require individuals to unlearn lessons of the past (Hedberg, 1981
as cited in Anderson and Tushman, 2001).
The arguments presented by the industrial organisation researchers
regard the marketplace within which a firm is operating, as the key
influencer of a firm’s chances of survival and success. As such external
market forces such as cyclical demand declines and turbulent demand
structures are regarded as having more impact on a firm’s wellbeing
than the manner in which a firm is managed [Sheppard, 1995]. Another
facet in the deterministic school of thought is organisational ecology;
this perspective also posits that external factors are more influential
than internal factors when it comes to firm survival however it is under-
pinned by a different set of arguments [Dess and Beard, 1984].
3.3.1.2 Organisational ecology perspective
The OE perspective regards organisations as entities that react slowly
to changes in the environment and as such are characterised by struc-
tural inertia [Hannan and Freeman, 1977]. As organisations are required
to be reliable and accountable for their actions organisational struc-
tures that guide day-to-day activities need to be highly reproducible
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and dependable, thus rules and regulations that ensure reliability and
accountability must remain in place and actions with a stable process
blueprint will be chosen over a less controllable action in an effort to
ensure consistency and stability [Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 1995].
As such organisational dissolution, according to an organisational ecol-
ogist, occurs when an organisation “ceases to carry out the routine
actions that sustain its structure, maintain flows of resources, and
retain the allegiance of its members” [Freeman et al., 1983, p. 694].
The premise of OE is one that believes organisations require a high
degree of structural inertia and this is a criterion for survival [Hannan
and Freeman, 1984]. Structural inertia is derived from internal struc-
tural arrangements and environmental constraints, however it specifi-
cally refers to the core characteristics of an organisation [Hannan and
Freeman, 1977]. The organisations environment generally negatively
evaluates adaptations to the core of an organisation, whereas changes
in the periphery are usually positively evaluated [Hannan and Free-
man, 1984]. The main purpose of organisational ecology is “to under-
stand the mutual interactions within and among the populations and
communities comprising organisational ecosystems and the mechanisms
and processes underlying their growth, regulation and decline” [Baum
and Singh, 1994, p. 5]. The main components considered important
by organisational ecologists are organisational age [Stinchcombe, 1965,
Henderson, 1999]; organisation size [Barnett and Amburgey, 1990,
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988]; population density [Hannan and Free-
man, 1988] and industry life cycle [Balderston, 1972; Agarwal and
Sarkar, 2002]. The last factor posits that firms follow a predefined
sequence independent of firms’ strategies and managements whereby
organisational failure is a natural irreversible phenomenon inherent to
efficient market operation [Klepper, 1997].
Another facet of OE is niche width theory [Hannan and Freeman,
1977], this focuses on environmental variability as a means of explaining
differential survival rates, first the specialist, which possesses few slack
resources and concentrates on exploiting a narrow range of customers,
and secondly, the generalist, which appeals to the mass market and
exhibits tolerance for more varied environments. Generalists drive out
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specialists in fluctuating environments, and the reverse is true in stable
environments [Hannan and Freeman, 1989]. Overall the OE perspective
is built on population density dependence logic [Hannan and Freeman,
1989], this views organisational mortality rates to be dependant on
the total number of firms within the relevant population. A U-shaped
relationship is suggested between density and failure, organisational
mortality starts high and falls as legitimacy increases, it then begins it
rise again as competition increases [Hannan and Freeman, 1988]. The
aforementioned determinants relied upon by OE demonstrate the over-
whelming support for the perspective that organisations are essentially
embedded within their environments and as such environmental fac-
tors have more influence than organisational factors. It is argued that
as environments change faster than organisations, the performance of
the firm is dictated by the environment within which it operates rather
than the firm’s strategic choice [Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004]. Organ-
isational ecologists have accumulated a wealth of empirical evidence
from a diverse range of organisational settings however a trade-off has
been favoured to the extent that generality of theories has been sac-
rificed for precision and realism [Singh, 1993]. Another fundamental
weakness in the perspective stems from the fact that the hard data
gathered such as firm size, age and density reveal little about the the-
oretical explanations underlying the empirical regularities.
The deterministic perspective of strategy formulation argues that
firms should adapt to their environments because characteristics of the
environment favour particular strategies over others. Also if chances
of survival are low for a certain variant it does not mean that organ-
isations in this industry are destined to fail rather that the ability of
management to change the organisation is of particular importance.
It has been argued that OE approaches do not relinquish individuals
from responsibility over their organisations’ success, regardless of rather
their actions are intelligent or foolish, planned or improvised, individu-
als do exert influence over organisations’ future [Baum and Amburgey,
2002]. However in times of uncertainty and ambiguity, severe con-
straints are placed on the ability of bounded rational individuals to con-
sistently conceive and implement changes that improve organizational
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success and survival chances in the face of competitive forces [Baum
and Amburgey, 2002]. Thus, “in a world of high uncertainty, adap-
tive efforts . . . turn out to be essentially random with respect to future
value” [Hannan and Freeman, 1984, p. 150]. Environmental determin-
ism was challenged by Bourgeois [1984, p. 589], who stated that the
“strategic decisions made my managers cannot be assumed to be the
product of deterministic forces in their environment. Any such assump-
tions would eliminate the very need for management because it implies
that the strategy of an organisation follows more or less automatically
from a technical appreciation of its environmental situation. On the
contrary, the very nature of the concept of strategy assumes a human
agent who is able to take actions that attempt to distinguish one’s
firm from the competitors”. The OI/OE perspective regards external
factors as the predominant cause of firm collapse and these factors
tend to be out of the control of management and are often dependant
on the economy and the decisions of policymakers. The most common
external factors are interest rates, the external price environment and
inflation, wage costs, declining markets, tax rates, market competition,
bad debts and late payments. Presently, the external factors throwing
firms into disarray are likely to stem from difficulty in raising capital,
low consumer confidence and a decimated global economy due to the
financial meltdown.
3.3.2 The voluntaristic school of thought
The voluntaristic perspective of business failure rejects the assumption
that the environmental factors have more explanatory power than firm-
level factors [Khelil, 2016]. It is founded on the belief that management
is the main decision maker within a firm, therefore their decisions and
perceptions greatly affect the firm and thus management is the funda-
mental cause of firm collapse [Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004]. The two
perspectives that elucidate the voluntaristic view are organisational
studies (OS) and organisational psychology (OP). The central premise
of the OS/OP literature is that who makes a decision is more important
than the external environment within which the decision is made [Mel-
lahi and Wilkinson, 2004]. The OS/OP approach views internal factors
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as the main precursors of business failure, and these endogenous fac-
tors are unique to the firm in question and vary between companies.
Management practices, accounting practices, marketing decisions and
financial planning are all examples of internal factors that impact upon
a firm’s performance. It has been suggested that internal factors have a
greater impact on the overall performance of a firm [Hansen and Wern-
erfelt, 1989, Fredland and Morris, 1976]. [Malone, 2004, p. 18] makes
reference to research findings discovering that just over 18% of busi-
ness failures were outside of the control of their leader’s. Ooghe and
DePrijcker [2008, p. 237] further reinforce this; they posit that unsuc-
cessful start-ups did not find any threat from its general environment,
except in recessionary times. Much of the internal research identifies
causes that collectively represent ‘bad management’ as the primary
root of business collapse [Kennedy, 1985, Haswell and Holmes, 1989;
Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992; Chowdhury and Lang, 1993, Beaver and
Jennings, 2005, Finkelstein, 2005, Ooghe and DePrijcker, 2008]. A com-
mon problem attributed to small enterprises is that senior management
responsibility is primarily invested in one person, who is unlikely to pos-
sess the entire spectrum of skills required to start and develop a new
business [Richardson et al., 1994]. The voluntaristic approach will now
be examined in further detail.
3.3.2.1 Organisation studies (OS)/organisational psychology (OP)
Essentially the OS/OP perspectives regard failure as occurring due
to internal inadequacies in dealing with external threats [Mellahi and
Wilkinson, 2004]. Argenti [1976] uses an interesting analogy of a sinking
ship to sum up the collapse of a company at the hands of an ineffective
manager:
‘If a ship is in good condition and the captain is compe-
tent it is almost impossible for it to be sunk by a wave or
a succession of waves. Even if there is a storm, the compe-
tent captain will have heard the weather forecast and taken
whatever measures are needed. Only a freak storm for which
inadequate notice has been given will sink the ship’.
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This quote mirrors the sentiments of Sheppard and Chowdhury [2005]
discussed earlier, a common theme amongst process models is the view
that management is regarded as “the origin of most problems” [Ooghe
and DePrijcker, 2008, p. 234]. According to Dillon and Tinsley [2008]
the actions of management in the face of adversity are related to past
experiences, if the firm has avoided failure previously then management
will be far more likely to make riskier decisions in the future despite any
reasonable reservations they may have. This relates to the arrogance
and complacency which success (or basically, lack of failure) can breed
within a firm. Learning from repeated successes can have a strong affect
on a company. It acts as a straightjacket, which changes it from its
once agile, adaptive state to one of structure and process [Baumard
and Starbuck, 2005]. Such complacency results in poor decision-making
from management and there is a general consensus in the literature
that poor decision-making is the cornerstone of managerial mistakes
and thus, of business collapse [Miller, 1992].
Finkelstein [2005] notes that many failures are essentially a prod-
uct of the companies CEO, whilst Richardson et al. [1994, p. 9] state
that the job of curbing or reversing potential business failure lies “first
and foremost, to organisations’ top managers”. Additionally Wiesen-
feld et al. [2008, p. 237] noted that failures contain the “hallmarks of
mismanagement”. However, it is Hambrick and D’Aveni [1992, p. 1450]
who go a step further through declaration that it is often “strong-willed,
dominating” and “egomaniacal” executives that are “at the helms of
unsuccessful firms”. These sentiments relate directly to upper echelon
theory [Hambrick and Mason, 1984] which argues that managers’ char-
acteristics, beliefs and perceptions influence their decisions and thus
affect firm performance or lack thereof. How an entrepreneur runs his
or her business is an extension of their own personal social value system
and is therefore highly impacted by the characteristics and beliefs of its
founder rather than environmental forces [Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996, Hambrick, 2007]. Sheth and Sisodia [2005, p. 29] argue that “an
organisations unwillingness to change comes from the myopia of its
leadership, an inability to change, on the other hand, come from its
processes”. Furthermore Pitts [2008, p. 17] postulates that a “business
will have the blueprint of the leaders personality ingrained into it”.
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The number and variety of experiences an individual has affect the
way the individual reacts and responds in various situations [Barker,
2005]. Also career variation has an influence, as people who have spent
an entire career in the same organisation often have limited perspec-
tives [Hambrick and Mason, 1984]. Research also indicates that when
a firm is faced with an external threat a new manager tends to view
the cause of the crisis as internal and hence controllable [Mellahi and
Wilkinson, 2004]. However long-serving managers have a tendency to
attribute failure to external, uncontrollable and temporary causes and
are inclined to ignore internal stimulants of failure, which in turn accel-
erates the problem [Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004]. It has also been
noted that people are prone to taking credit for their own successes
but have a tendency to blame failures on circumstances beyond their
control [Barker, 2005]; this concept will be explored in greater detail
later on with explicit reference to attribution theory.
The effects of organizational decline and the responses it evokes are
regarded as diametrically opposing depending on the theoretical per-
spective taken. Mone et al. [1998] argue that if decline represents a gap
between performance and aspirations then according to organizational
learning theorists it stimulates adaptation and organizational change
Cyert and March [1963], Kiesler and Sproull [1982]. Conversely threat
rigidity theorists argue that decline is inhibiting as it constrains cog-
nitive function and restricts decision-making, thus reducing the poten-
tial for adaptation and organizational change Mone et al. [1998], Staw
et al. [1981]. The premise of threat rigidity effect theory is that indi-
viduals, groups and organisations have a tendency to behave rigidly
in threatening situations and attempt to maintain status quo [Mel-
lahi and Wilkinson, 2004]. Management runs the risk of making poor
choices when faced with the stressful conditions experienced through
firm difficulty. A choice such as enforcing cost cutting measures when
a firm is already in a weak strategic position is more likely to place
the firm in a worse position strategically rather than strengthen the
case for survival [Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004]. This is an example of
‘error-amplifying decision trap’ where a poor response to a problem
exacerbates the issue rather than rectify it [Schulman, 1989].
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The ‘curse of success’ is another facet of firm collapse that is dis-
cussed in the OS literature [Kelly and Amburgey, 1991, Miller, 1992,
Starbuck et al., 1978, Argenti, 1976]. According to McGrath [1999,
p. 16] an unintended consequence of pursuing success and avoiding
failure is the tendency to attain not only valuable lessons “but also the
distortions of those lessons”. Learning from repeated successes makes
future failure more likely as periods of continued prosperity foster struc-
tural and strategic inertia, extreme process orientations, inattention
and insularity [Baumard and Starbuck, 2005]. In a sense management
become dazzled by success and complacency sets in [Ooghe and DePri-
jcker, 2008]. Furthermore, Tinsley et al. [2011] argue that individu-
als who have narrowly escaped failure in the past choose significantly
riskier alternatives in the future than those who have not experienced
near misses. The near miss is seen as a success, thus reducing per-
ceived risk and increasing one’s comfort with risky decisions. Having
the ability to recognise failure helps entrepreneurs gain further insights
into success, “failure is not a lack of success but an integral part of it”
[Thorne, 2000, p. 306]. Constant success on the other hand breeds fail-
ure; it can make companies complacent and even arrogant, firms can
get “locked in to certain orthodoxies and therefore do not take charge
of their own destinies fast enough” [Sheth and Sisodia, 2005, p. 28]. The
experience of failure can ultimately lead to the path to success; a sce-
nario termed a ‘successful failure’ [Kriegesmann et al., 2005], whereby
individuals are provided with a personalised learning experience as they
learn from their own failure trajectory. Other scholars [Schoemaker and
Gunther, 2006] suggest making ‘deliberate mistakes’ as a means of com-
bating failure. Then if one of a company’s core assumptions is wrong,
the firm can achieve success faster by deliberately making errors than
by considering only data that support the assumption. A factor that
may inhibit learning from failure is stigmatization, as labelling fail-
ure negatively affects both entrepreneurs and organisations that fail
to learn from it [Thorne, 2000]. However according to Malone [2004,
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p. 20] “the ability to fail and bounce back seems to be a common
characteristic among successful owners” perhaps because they realise
that they do not know everything and are more willing and receptive
to learning. Learning from failure and stigmatization will be explored
in greater detail later in this monograph.
4
Business Failure in the Entrepreneurship
Literature
The topic of business failure remains an understudied aspect of the
entrepreneurial process [Jenkins and McKelvie, 2016], however interest
in, and momentum for, research in this area is growing. According to
Jenkins and McKelvie [2016] entrepreneurial failure remains unclear
due to the varying conceptualisations of failure. It can be explored
using objective or subjective criteria, at both the firm and individual
levels of analysis. The way in which it is conceptualised influences com-
parability across studies and the relevance of research questions posed
[Jenkins and McKelvie, 2016]. The remainder of this monograph focuses
on the topic of business failure within the entrepreneurship literature.
Contemporary studies related to various aspects of the phenomena are
discussed. Particular attention is given to the areas of enquiry that
have, thus far, dominated literature in the area. Primarily attributions,
learning, emotions and recovery are the growing themes within the con-
temporary business failure entrepreneurship literature that are covered.
This section begins with an exploration of research on causes of failure
from the entrepreneurs’ perspective.
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4.1 Causes of failure
The importance of remedying internal problems as they occur is
acknowledged by Argenti [1976, p. 122] — “only corrective actions that
would solve the fundamental causes of the difficulties would really lead
to lasting recovery”. This view is further supported by Abdelsamad
and Kindling [1978, p. 372] as they see potential in reducing the rate
of failure “if some of its causes are recognized and preventative action
is taken”. A similar perspective is held within the turnaround liter-
ature as Schendel and Patton [1976] argue that significant declines
and sharp drops in performance are often prerequisites for success-
ful turnaround efforts. Their key contribution lay in the dichotomy of
causes and the manner in which these may influence the appropriate-
ness of the turnaround response. In contrast Fredland and Morris [1976]
posit that the search for the causes of failure is largely concerned with
ascribing blame — a futile exercise, given the complexities involved in
small business failure. Despite this perspective Fredland and Morris
[1976] do concede that recognition of the differences between endoge-
nous and exogenous causes (as discussed in Section 3.3) of business
failure facilitates further clarification of the phenomena. As noted by
Wagner, III and Gooding [1997], to understand failure events we must
determine the cause of those failures.
4.1.1 Attribution theory
Although causes of business failure were the subject of much interest
during the 1970s through to the 1990s, within the entrepreneurship
literature explicit discussion about failure causes is muted. Instead
the sources of failure are explored using softer language, the term
‘attribution’ is adopted in place of ‘cause’. A cause indicates a rea-
son, a priori explanation whereas attributions represent perceived
cause. Attributions are mechanisms through which people explain
their behavior, the actions of others and events around them [Heider,
1958, Zacharakis et al., 1999]. The attributions an individual makes
for an event influence his or her cognitive, behavioral and affective
responses to the event [Dweck and Leggett, 1988]. Exploring failure
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through attributions rather than causes is particularly suited to the
entrepreneurship field as it enables failure to be examined from the
viewpoint of the entrepreneur. An individual making attributions about
an event has critical implications for the individual’s ability to learn
from, make sense of, and prosper following the failure experience [Shep-
herd, 2009a,b].
A key debate within the management literature has arisen sur-
rounding biases associated with attribution theory, in particular,
self-serving attribution bias. Such a bias incorporates the notion that
individuals tend to assume their own actions (internal attributions),
explain positive outcomes, whilst actions independent of themselves
(external attributions) explain positive outcomes [Rogoff et al., 2004].
Similarly entrepreneurs’ overconfident in their abilities are more likely
to blame factors outside of their control for failure [Busenitz and Bar-
ney, 1997, Eggers and Song, 2015]. However a study by Mantere et al.
[2013] strongly suggests that entrepreneurs do not avoid taking respon-
sibility for failure. In fact entrepreneurs’ abilities to confront their fail-
ure experience is described as a form of ‘catharsis’. Some earlier studies
[Gaskill et al., 1993, Zacharakis et al., 1999] have also posited that
entrepreneurs are more likely to make internal attributions for fail-
ure than external attributions. Such studies present entrepreneurs as
differing from the general populace when it comes to failure attribu-
tions, thus highlighting the complexity of entrepreneurs’ business fail-
ure attributions. This distinction is important, attributions not only
provide insight into perceived causes of failure, they also dictate how
entrepreneurs feel about the failure and in turn how they react and
learn from the experience [Shepherd, 2003, Shepherd and Cardon,
2009]. Furthermore if the failure is largely attributed to external causes
the individuals may feel that they have less to learn from the experience
yet their beliefs about others, the organization, and the environment
are likely to change [Shepherd et al., 2011]. Various factors have the
power to influence the way in which an entrepreneur attributes his or
her failure experience, one such factor is time. Over the passing of time
individuals gain distance from the event and have an ability to view it
as an external observer rather than a participant [Libby and Eibach,
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2002]. The distance in turn provides a new perspective on the event
and has been found to influence one’s attributions [Pronin and Ross,
2006, Shepherd et al., 2011].
Self-esteem can also impact attributions with individuals who have
high self-esteem more likely to direct negative attention away from
themselves and towards more positive aspects of their character so their
ego remains unharmed. In this instance failure may become compart-
mentalized and learning from it is increasingly difficult [Baumeister,
1996]. Failure can provide a rich learning experience however the abil-
ity to utilize and harness that learning effectively requires accurate
attribution of the cause of failure [Yamakawa et al., 2010]. A selection
of key contributions on business failure and attribution theory is pre-
sented in Table 4.1. The proceeding section delves into the factors that
impact entrepreneurial learning from a failure experience in greater
detail.
4.2 Literature related to learning from business failure
In the past, much of entrepreneurial research related to uncovering
entrepreneurs’ traits. This is an “old-style typology thinking” [Saras-
vathy, 2004, p. 701] controversial in the entrepreneurship field [Rauch
and Frese, 2007], and less sophisticated than robust contemporary trait
research incorporating genetics and psychology. It attempted to dis-
cern “who an entrepreneur is”, however such an approach fails to
account for an entrepreneur’s ability to learn and change [Gartner,
1989, Wang and Chugh, 2014]. According to Minniti and Bygrave
[2001, p. 7] “entrepreneurship is a process of learning, and a theory
of entrepreneurship requires a theory of learning”. Scholarly interest
in entrepreneurial learning has grown since 2000 (for a comprehensive
overview see Wang and Chugh, 2014) and it was the subject of a spe-
cial issue of Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice in 2005. The work
of the late Jason Cope has been particularly instrumental in driving
this line of enquiry and has contributed significantly to the formula-
tion of entrepreneurial learning (EL) theory through phenomenological
analysis [Pittaway and Thorpe, 2012, Cope, 2011]. EL is defined as the
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Table 4.1: Attributions and business failure.
Author(s) Key findings
Yamakawa and
Cardon [2015]
Examines causal ascriptions for failure and the perceived learning
for entrepreneurs that re-entered self-employment following a
failure experience. Internal unstable failure ascriptions enhance
learning from failure, particularly when the entrepreneur takes a
shorter time to restart. Meanwhile external stable failure
ascriptions hinder learning from failure especially when
entrepreneurs change industry with their subsequent venture.
Mantere et al.
[2013]
Different actors make sense of entrepreneurial failure in different
ways. Narrative attribution accounts of the failure experience help
individuals understand the complex failure process. Seven narrative
accounts were unearthed — catharsis, hubris, zeitgeist, betrayal,
nemesis, mechanistic and fate. Results suggest that entrepreneurial
failure attributions do not conform to the norms of attribution
theory in that entrepreneurs do not avoid taking personal
responsibility for failure through self-serving biases.
Zacharakis et al.
[1999]
The study exploring matched pairs of VCs and entrepreneurs to
assess differences in causes of business failure found that
entrepreneurs are more likely to make internal attributions for
failure than external attributions. However entrepreneurs view
others more harshly — they attribute internal factors 58% of the
time for their ventures but 89% of the time for others’ ventures.
Rogoff et al. [2004] Both self-serving bias and actor-observer bias, inherent to
attribution theory, are observed among entrepreneurs when
discussing factors that impede small business success. Thus
concluding that entrepreneurs have a bias towards blaming external
factors for failure.
Yamakawa et al.
[2015]
In order to facilitate effective learning from failure entrepreneurs
should find some aspect of failure to attribute internally rather than
blaming predominantly external, environmental factors. However
internally attributing business failure can be harmful, if there is an
increasing number of failures it diminishes one’s self-efficacy.
Mandl et al. [2016] This paper explores how entrepreneurs’ attributions for past failure
predict their future activities. Entrepreneurs who experience failure
and go on to start a subsequent venture differ from those who do
not re-enter an entrepreneurial career. Further analysis of
entrepreneurs’ failure attributions is called for.
Franco and Haase
[2010]
Owner–managers attribute poor firm performance to causes that
differ from reality. Owner–managers mainly cite external factors as
the cause of failure however internal factors are not satisfactorily
recognized. Individuals in the study adhered to the tenets of
attribution theory and were found to be more likely to ascribe
failures to external causes.
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“learning experienced by entrepreneurs during the creation and devel-
opment of a small enterprise, rather than a particular style or form
of learning that could be described as “entrepreneurial” [Cope, 2005,
p. 374]. EL theory proposes that discontinuous experiences during the
entrepreneurial process stimulates higher forms of learning important
to the entrepreneur both personally and professionally [Cope, 2003,
2011, Minniti and Bygrave, 2001]. Failure is one such discontinuous
event.
Firm failure is largely viewed by society as a negative consequence of
business; however failure provides a lens for truly understanding one’s
success. It is a highly personalised opportunity for learning and given
that the majority of business owners leave business through a revolving
door rather than a one-way exit [Stokes and Blackburn, 2002], failure
is merited as an important learning tool [Cope, 2011, McGrath and
Cardon, 1997, Schoemaker and Gunther, 2006, Ucbasaran et al., 2010].
Failure acts as a catalyst for further economic and business develop-
ment [McGrath, 1999], however at a micro-level it also has an effect
on the individual. For entrepreneurs, learning from business failure
occurs when they revise “their existing knowledge of how to manage
their own business effectively [Shepherd, 2003, p. 320], through expand-
ing their range of potential behaviors, changing ineffective practices,
highlighting mistakes and augmenting skills and knowledge about the
entrepreneurial process [Cope, 2011]. Seminal research by Cope [2005,
2011] led to the development of four broad themes that encompass an
entrepreneurs’ learning outcomes from failure. First, oneself, the failure
experience allows for immense learning about oneself, one’s strengths,
weakness, skills, attitudes, beliefs, and the areas one needs to develop.
It is a transformative learning that enables entrepreneurs to better
understand themselves. Secondly, the venture, an entrepreneur gains
greater perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of the venture,
in addition to understanding the reasons for the failure. Thirdly, net-
works and relationships, failure also provides an opportunity for social
learning outcomes. Entrepreneurs that experience failure learn lessons
related to the nature and management of relationships both internal
to the firm and in their wider network. Fourthly, venture management,
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this learning outcome transcends the specific failure context and equips
entrepreneurs with the skills needed to lead and manage entrepreneurial
pursuits. An entrepreneur learns about leadership and the effective
management of business in relation to the wider environment.
Contrary to expectation entrepreneurs that experience failure are
not less confident or more likely to steer clear from entrepreneurial
opportunities in the future; in fact, such individuals display similar or
greater amounts of positivity and entrepreneurial eagerness than their
successful counterparts [Cardon et al., 2011]. Failed entrepreneurs see
their failure as a rite of passage or an “entrance fee for entrepreneur-
ship” [Ucbasaran et al., 2006, p. 24], and “recovery and re-emergence
from failure is a function of distinctive learning processes” [Cope, 2011,
p. 604]. Learning from one’s personal experience of failure allows for
a tailored form of learning that cannot be taught, merely attained
through practice [Kriegesmann et al., 2005]. The way an individual acts
during setbacks can have a vital influence on subsequent performance
as it establishes how one copes in threatening, stressful situations
[Locke and Taylor, 1991]. Despite the interest in how entrepreneurs can
learn from failure [Cope, 2011, Minniti and Bygrave, 2001, Shepherd,
2003, Ucbasaran et al., 2013], the learning process remains unclear
[Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015]. Learning is neither automatic nor
instantaneous [Shepherd, 2003], with entrepreneurs varying in their
ability to maximize learning from failure [Ucbasaran et al., 2010]. Prior
experience of failure does not necessarily lead to future success [Green
et al., 2003].
A small but growing number of studies investigate how prior failure
impacts entrepreneurial learning for future venturing [Yamakawa et al.,
2015, Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015, Mandl et al., 2016]. These stud-
ies are important, as learning is not complete until the entrepreneurs
can test their new ideas in another context [Shepherd, 2003]. However
“the scientific understanding of the negative effects of errors is much
better developed than that of the potential positive effects of errors”
[Van Dyck et al., 2005, p. 1228]. Essentially it is difficult to measure
learning outcomes from failure [Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015]. It has
been argued that failure can increase an entrepreneur’s likelihood of
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success when it is used as a learning instrument [Cope, 2011, Saras-
vathy and Menon, 2003]. Yet the empirical evidence of entrepreneurial
learning remains weak [Frankish et al., 2013]. Cognitive evidence is
based on entrepreneurs’ self-reporting about their learning experiences
[DeClerq and Sapienza, 2005], an approach criticised by Frankish et al.
[2013]; they question the likelihood that an individual will claim to have
learned nothing from their failure. Ultimately DeClerq and Sapienza
[2005] posit that objective learning is almost impossible to verify,
whilst Frankish et al. [2013] argue that the role of chance and circum-
stance increases the difficulties in separating lessons from the ‘noise’.
Underpinning work on entrepreneurial learning is the assumption “that
entrepreneurs learn and, as a consequence, their business performance
improves” [Frankish et al., 2013, p. 81]. Jenkins and McKelvie [2016]
highlight three existing streams of research that may be useful for schol-
ars keen to focus on entrepreneurial learning from failure, these include
real options reasoning [McGrath, 1999], knowledge diffusion [Hoetker
and Agarwal, 2007] and project failure [Corbett et al., 2007]. A num-
ber of contemporary studies explore whether prior experience of busi-
ness failure impacted entrepreneur’s learning ability; the results are
displayed on Table 4.2. The key findings do not provide conclusive sup-
port for entrepreneurial learning as a result of a business failure experi-
ence. The process of learning from failure thus still remains a blackbox,
by and large [Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015, Cannon and Edmondson,
2001, Jenkins, 2012]. There are opposing views on the potential learning
benefits of the failure experience and both have merits. Many factors
affect the learning capacity of entrepreneurs; these include sensemak-
ing [Yamakawa et al., 2015] and grief [Shepherd, 2003, Shepherd and
Kuratko, 2009]. These elements are explored in further detail in the
proceeding section of the monograph.
4.3 Literature related to emotions and failure
In recent years the entrepreneurship field has experienced an increased
interest in exploring the emotional dimensions of entrepreneurship.
Entrepreneurship became recognised as an emotional journey [Baron,
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Table 4.2: Learning after a business failure experience.
Author(s) Key findings
Frankish et al.
[2013]
The study showed that prior experience as an owner had no
substantial influence, positive or negative, on chances of survival for
3 years. Furthermore, amongst those that survive 3 years, they are
no less likely to engage in “life threatening” behavior the more
experience they accumulate. Even if entrepreneurs learn something
from their experience it does not clearly translate into improved
performance.
Nielsen and
Sarasvathy [2011]
Findings indicate that previously failed entrepreneurs were more
likely to start-up a second time. However “the mere act of failing
did not result in learning effects. Instead, some form of absorptive
capacity (in terms of education and moral support) was necessary
for entrepreneurs to benefit from the learning possibilities inherent
in their experience of failure in the first firm” (2011, p. 4).
Ucbasaran et al.
[2010]
Experience of business failure offers learning opportunities but only
under certain conditions. Entrepreneurs that experience business
failure are heterogeneous and learning differs based on entrepreneur
types. Findings support the validity of opposing views on possible
learning benefits.
Metzger [2006,
2007]
Previous entrepreneurial failure experience (measured by
bankruptcy) does not increase subsequent firm performance (2006).
In fact entrepreneurs who re-start after failure are significantly
more likely to fail (2007).
Cope [2003] Although learning is considered a continuous process there is more
to be learned from discontinuous events rather than incremental,
habitual, ‘lower-level’ learning. Discontinuous events stimulate a
higher form of learning and critical reflection that can be
transformational.
Toft-Kehler et al.
[2014]
Study focused on how experience affects performance by examining
longitudinal data on focused on the majority stakeholder of newly
created privately owned Swedish firms in knowledge-intensive
industries between 1990 and 2007 (n = 65, 390). Results show that
learning in entrepreneurship is possible but conditional on
important content and contextual barriers. Individuals must
leverage prior experiences, a skill that takes time to develop.
Essentially experience can negatively affect performance among
novice entrepreneurs however it can positively affect the
performance returns among expert entrepreneurs. Furthermore
context similarities between prior and current ventures strengthen
this direct effect.
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2008] and the central role affect and emotions play in entrepreneur-
ship became the subject of studies [Foo, 2011, Shepherd et al.,
2009a,b, 2011]. The field ignited with studies on affect culminating
in a 2012 special issue in Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice on
entrepreneurial emotion, which was referred to as a ‘hot topic’ [Cardon
et al., 2012]. Entrepreneurial emotion is defined by [Cardon et al., 2012,
p. 3] as “the affect, emotions, moods, and/or feelings — of individu-
als or a collective — that are antecedent to, concurrent with, and/or
a consequence of the entrepreneurial process, meaning the recogni-
tion/creation, evaluation, reformulation, and/or the exploitation of a
possible opportunity”. One criticism of the progress made in the area of
entrepreneurial emotion stems from the fact that most work “deals with
either the early or late stages of a business” [Cardon et al., 2012, p. 3].
According to Cardon et al. [2005] entrepreneurs often form a per-
sonal connection and identify with their business to the extent that the
firm is seen as an extension of themselves. When a business or project
fails it may damage an emotional bond between the entrepreneur and
the idea/firm, personal and professional relationships may be lost as a
firm closes and a collective identity is fractured [Shepherd and Kuratko,
2009, Wolfe and Shepherd, 2015]. In business, emotional attachments
can be difficult to break [Burgelman, 1994], thus when failure occurs
may invoke an array of negative emotions in the entrepreneur includ-
ing humiliation and pain [Cardon and McGrath, 1999, Cope, 2011,
Ucbasaran et al., 2013, Singh et al., 2007]. However people respond
to failure in different ways, some are overcome with feelings of guilt
and shame attached to failure whilst others recover quickly. Similarly,
embarrassment and grief can adversely affect self-esteem and confi-
dence for some, whilst others are only momentarily affected [Boss and
Sims Jr, 2008, Shepherd and Kuratko, 2009, Jenkins et al., 2014]. Emo-
tion regulation is the process individuals engage to influence the emo-
tions they have, when they have them and the way in which they are
expressed/experienced [Gross, 1998, Boss and Sims Jr, 2008]. Emotion
regulation is paramount in shaping the entrepreneurs perspective of
their failure experience. Furthermore “if a person uses emotion regula-
tion in the form of situation selection before a failed event occurs, that
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event may never happen, or it may never be considered a failure” [Boss
and Sims Jr, 2008, p. 141]. Fear of failure is one such emotion that influ-
ences entrepreneurial behavior. According to Welpe et al. [2012] fear
reduces exploitation and minimizes the relationship between evaluation
and exploitation. Thus fear of failure leads to entrepreneurs avoiding
situations that may result in failure or reacting poorly to potential fail-
ure situations. This leads to an ‘error-amplifying decision trap’ whereby
a poor response to a problem merely results in exacerbating the issue
rather than rectifying it [Schulman, 1989].
Conversely joy and anger increase exploitation and magnify the
relationship between evaluation and exploitation [Welpe et al., 2012].
Optimistic individuals are more inclined to see adversity as a challenge
and as such maintain confidence during the failure process [Ucbasaran
et al., 2013]. Confidence (i.e. an emotionally-laden belief that engenders
the positive emotions) and overconfidence can engender entrepreneurial
resilience and may reduce the emotional costs of failure [Hayward et al.,
2010, Ucbasaran et al., 2013]. Thus effective emotion regulation has
the potential not only to reduce failure but it can also increase chances
of success. Studies exploring emotion in the final stages of a business
coalesce mainly around coping and recovering from business failure. A
notable contributor to this field is Dean Shepherd, who, along with
other researchers, has driven the research strand on entrepreneurial
grief in the aftermath of a failure experience [Shepherd, 2003, 2009a,b,
Shepherd and Kuratko, 2009, Shepherd and Cardon, 2009, Shepherd
et al., 2011].
4.3.1 Grief
Grief usually occurs as a result of the loss of something important
[Archer, 1999]. For an entrepreneur, his or her business is important,
it provides security and autonomy; if it fails it is likely to elicit a neg-
ative emotional response [Shepherd, 2009a,b]. In turn negative emo-
tional responses interfere with an individual’s attention allocation in
the processing of information. Thus, grief is a significant obstacle to
learning from failure Shepherd [2003], Cope [2011]. The more sudden
and rapid the failure process unfolds, the greater the grief experience
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[Shepherd, 2009a,b]. Grief intensity is not only affected by the speed
in which the firm unravelled but also the time since it occurred [Shep-
herd, 2009a,b]. In the immediate aftermath of failure strong emotions
are commonplace whilst over time less emotional responses and inter-
pretations of the experience emerge [Ucbasaran et al., 2010]. Accord-
ing to Shepherd [2009a,b, p. 81] grief dynamics are also “important in
understanding why some people make sense of loss and recover from
grief quickly while others cannot”. Three grief dynamics are proposed
in relation to business failure: loss-oriented, restoration-oriented and
transition oriented. Loss-oriented dynamics includes facing the loss
and working through the grief process; it is mentally and physically
draining on the entrepreneur. On the other hand restoration-oriented
dynamics includes avoiding thinking about the loss and instead focus-
ing on secondary sources of stress; this involves emotion suppression
that requires mental effort and may adversely affect both the indi-
vidual’s health and learning. Thirdly, transition-oriented dynamics are
those that shift between the loss and restoration-oriented dynamics;
this allows the individual to get the learning benefits of each and speed
up the recovery process [Shepherd, 2009a,b].
Anticipatory grief is another of Shepherd’s contributions to this
stream of literature [Shepherd et al., 2009a,b]. Its premise is that once
an individual mentally prepares for failure in advance of it occurring
they may reduce the emotional costs of failure and recovery faster from
the event [Shepherd, 2009a,b, Shepherd and Wolfe, 2014]. Grief can
help entrepreneurs assimilate the failure experience failure and enable
them to overcome negative psychological responses ideally before they
manifest into physiological symptoms [Shepherd, 2009a,b]. When an
individual takes time to confront loss, recovery from that loss is more
likely; in particular anticipatory grief may allow entrepreneurs to grad-
ually distance themselves from the firm before failure actually occurs
Table 4.3.
Another research strand deemed essential to both learning from
failure and coping with the emotional repercussions of failure is
the sensemaking perspective. There is variation in the extent to
which entrepreneurs’ experience certain emotions following a failure
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Table 4.3: Grief and business failure.
Author(s) Key findings
Shepherd [2003] There may be an emotional relationship between entrepreneurs and
their businesses. The entrepreneurs’ motives often transcend profits
and incorporates pride and independence. However many
businesses fail and such failure can lead to grief. A dual process of
grief recovery involving oscillating between a loss and a restoration
orientation can speed up the process.
Shepherd [2009a,b] More emotionally intelligent individuals are better able to harness
their grief to facilitate information processing about their loss and
assist others to do the same. Groups (in this case families) recover
from grief through emotional capability (ability to recognize and
regulate emotions and anticipate, differentiate and understand the
emotions of its members). Entrepreneurs that experience failure
may be able to better regulate their emotions and recover from
grief at a faster rate.
Shepherd et al.
[2009a]
When a project fails grief can be managed through regulating
negative emotions or normalizing them. Coping self-efficacy is key
for regulating negative emotions generated by grief. If there is an
absence of high levels of coping self-efficacy then a normalization
approach to grief management may be superior.
Jenkins et al.
[2014]
The grief experiences of entrepreneurs that experience failure differ.
When entrepreneurs interpret failure as involving loss of
self-esteem, reduced independence and increased financial strain,
they experience greater feeling of grief. However some entrepreneurs
(in particular portfolio and hybrid entrepreneurs) still have
additional employment roles to fulfill, which act as psychological
compensation. Therefore these individuals experience less (or no)
grief from the business failure.
Shepherd and
Kuratko [2009]
When entrepreneurs are committed to a project or a business, its
failure generates grief. Grief interferes with the learning process.
Enhancing grief recovery facilitates the learning process and results
in more emotionally intelligent individuals more effective at
executing the grief recovery process. Self-compassion can also
reduce learning obstructions.
Shepherd et al.
[2009b]
The concept of ‘anticipatory grief’ is introduced as a means of
understanding why owner-managers often delay business failure
when it is financial costly to do so. Anticipatory grief reduces the
grief experienced by the owner-manager which in turn reduces the
emotional costs of failure. Thus the emotional recovery of the
owner-manager may be enhanced by a decision to delay business
failure, therefore the delay may help ‘balance’ the financial and
emotional costs to optimize recovery.
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experience. For example Jenkins et al. [2014] found that an individ-
ual’s perception of the harm or loss resulting from the failure had a
greater influence on feelings of grief than more tangible variables such
as alternative employment options. Therefore entrepreneurial percep-
tion of the failure has an impact on how they respond and behave dur-
ing the failure process. The sensemaking perspective has been applied
to the failure context in order to shed light on the way entrepreneurs
synthesise and assimilate the business failure experience. This is now
examined in greater detail.
4.3.2 Sensemaking
Entrepreneurship research has been criticised for its lack of recognition
of the social context within which it operates [Rauch and Frese, 2000].
Failure has repercussions for individuals, organizations and society; as
such it is necessary to explore how entrepreneurs and communities make
sense of it [Cardon et al., 2011]. The sensemaking perspective is a way
for entrepreneurship scholars to address the critic of contextual myopia
and provide greater insight into the process by which business failure
is processed and overcome. It is well established within the strategy,
change management, innovation process and grief literatures [Gioia and
Chittipeddi, 1991, Shepherd, 2009a,b] however only recently has it been
co-opted by entrepreneurship researchers as a means of understand-
ing business failure [Shepherd et al., 2011, Byrne and Shepherd, 2015,
Cardon et al., 2011, Wolfe and Shepherd, 2015, Heinze, 2013]. Wolfe
and Shepherd [2015, p. 900] describe the interest on sensemaking in
the organizational context in recent years as “a considerable theoreti-
cal movement”. Sensemaking is a social activity; people create mean-
ing about events and situations through their interactions with oth-
ers rather than in isolation [Weick, 1979]. Social interaction is impor-
tant in understanding why some people are able to make sense of loss
while others are not [Shepherd, 2009a,b]. Sensemaking is an iterative
process whereby entrepreneurs assign meaning to occurrences in con-
junction with action [Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991, Shepherd, 2009a,b].
It is about the “placement of items into frameworks, comprehending,
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redressing surprise, constructing meaning, [and] interacting in pursuit
of mutual understanding” [Weick, 1995, p. 6].
Three key aspects comprise the sensemaking process — scanning,
interpretation and learning [Thomas et al., 1993]. When entrepreneurs
experience business failure they tend to look for causal explanations
to account for the demise, such as — ‘What happened?’ and ‘Why?’
these scanning questions signal the beginning of the sense-making pro-
cess. The interpretation phase involves attaining greater understanding
of the situation through retrospectively connecting events to potential
causes and attributing those causes. The way in which circumstances
are interpreted or labeled influences action in a particular direction
thus interpretation of ambiguous information is regarded as critical
[Shepherd et al., 2011]. Finally the learning phase is contingent on
the entrepreneurs’ reactions to the failure, it is the culmination of the
sensemaking process which involves continuously evolving plausible ret-
rospective accounts of past events that inform current action [Weick
et al., 2005, Shepherd et al., 2011]. Sensemaking is of particular impor-
tance for entrepreneurs operating in complex, dynamic environments as
they are often presented with ambiguous and challenging scenarios that
they must interpret [Thomas et al., 1993, Shepherd et al., 2011], failure
being one such scenario. According to Shepherd et al. [2011, p. 1232]
“an assumption of sensemaking is that constraints (such as those that
caused a project to fail) are self-imposed and that an individual’s envi-
ronment is not predetermined nor impervious to individual influence”.
Essentially the environment is enacted, further underlining the impor-
tance of an individual’s interpretation and understanding of events as
they inform the entrepreneur’s response. Sensemaking in turbulent con-
ditions is dominated by two core themes: shared meanings and emotion
(see Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010 for a full discussion). The shared
meanings facet of sensemaking is important as failure rarely happens
in a vacuum, it often effects others beyond those immediately involved.
Shared meaning influences how individuals, teams, firms, and cultures
inform each other’s perspectives through his or her actions and reac-
tions to the failure process. Emotion is important as the entrepreneurial
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Table 4.4: Sensemaking and business failure.
Author(s) Key findings
Maitlis and
Sonenshein [2010]
Sensemaking in turbulent contexts, such as change and crises
highlights the importance, yet elusiveness, of shared meanings.
Furthermore emotions play a key role in the sensemaking process in
such contexts. Positive emotions such as hope, relief, and joy can
also be found in periods of crises and change.
Byrne and
Shepherd [2015]
Found evidence that negative emotions motivated sensemaking
efforts. Failure accounts that reflected little negative emotional
reaction to business failure demonstrated little sensemaking about
the experience. Negative and positive emotions together facilitate
sensemaking, negative emotions motivate whilst positive emotions
inform, sensemaking efforts.
Cardon et al.
[2011]
Focused on cultural sensemaking about failure and explored the
propensity to blame misfortunes versus mistakes. Whilst failures
were blamed fairly evenly on mistakes and misfortunes, regional
differences were found. Findings showed that cities with the highest
number of failure accounts, blamed failures more on mistakes of
entrepreneurs, whilst cities with fewer failure accounts
predominantly blamed failure on misfortunes.
Wolfe and
Shepherd [2015]
Narrative communication is used to assess sensemaking in
organisations that have experienced project failure. Findings
provide preliminary evidence of how emotional content within
narratives can change in an attempt to make sense of prior
experiences. Project failure rates increase negative emotional
content within narratives. Furthermore narratives’ positive
emotional content is associated with reduced negative emotional
content. Finally, positive performance events moderated the
relationship between positive and negative emotional content,
enhancing the effects of this relationship.
Heinze [2013] Sensemaking in the aftermath of failure is a complex, multilayered
process. Grief and suffering are important to the sensemaking
process. Entrepreneurs’ perceptions are influenced by the extent to
which other individuals are affected by failure. Entrepreneurs felt a
need to look for positive outcomes from their failure experience.
failure experience can be a traumatic event, generating negative emo-
tions which can interfere with one’s learning process [Shepherd, 2003].
Table 4.4 details a selection of the recent publications that explored
the sensemaking process in the aftermath of a business/project failure
event.
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4.3.3 Fear
Fear is an emotional response induced by a perceived threat. Fear of
failure is one of the most common fears experienced by entrepreneurs
[Bosma et al., 2008] and it has a profound impact on entrepreneurial
action [Morgan and Sisak, 2016, Mitchell and Shepherd, 2011].
However, despite the increasing focus on affect in response to failure,
research on fear as an emotion preceding and potentially inhibiting
action is sparse [Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015]. Current and growing
interest in both the Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Approach System
(BIS/BAS) and the Dark Triad [Hmieleski and Lerner, forthcoming,
Haynes et al., 2015a,b, Mathieu and St-Jean, 2013, Ronningstam and
Baskin-Sommers, 2013] questions individuals’ ability to experience fear
(e.g. psychopathy/BAS) and offers a discursive context for fear (and
fear of failure) to be explored in greater detail within the entrepreneur-
ship literature. The Dark Triad encompasses Machiavellianism, narcis-
sism and psychopathy, “an important cluster of antagonistic person-
alities in psychology” [Jones and Figueredo, 2013, p. 521], tentatively
linked to entrepreneurial entry [Hmieleski and Lerner, forthcoming],
intention [Kramer et al., 2011] and behavior [Rauch and Hatak, 2015].
Situations that evoke such fear elicit different responses — some may
respond aggressively to the threat, others avoid facing the situation
as a means of protecting oneself, whilst more still become paralyzed
by the situation, known as the fight-flight-freeze reaction [Gray and
McNaughton, 2000]. Despite fear being considered a negative emotion,
it has also long been recognized, as a driving force that effectively moti-
vates human beings [Mowrer, 1939]. However within the entrepreneur-
ship literature fear of failure has traditionally been dismissed as an
entirely negative aspect of one’s character however this perspective is
changing as it may be an impairment to be conquered or a positive con-
dition to be embraced depending on the context [Morgan and Sisak,
2016, Mitchell and Shepherd, 2011, Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015]. In
this section recent literature on the concept is explored and the origins
of its negative framing are examined.
Fear of failure is generally described as “generalized desire to avoid
failure” [Elliot and Church, 1997, p. 220]. Three dimensions encompass
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this desire, fears of — devaluing one’s self-estimate, upsetting impor-
tant others and having an uncertain future [Conroy, 2001]. These
dimensions have a varying effect on entrepreneurial action, essentially
“not all fear of failure is created equal” [Mitchell and Shepherd, 2011,
p. 196]. Certain situations combine with fear dimensions and hamper
the likelihood of entrepreneurial action, such as the interaction between
specific human capital and fear of devaluing self. However, a differ-
ing combination may in fact propel entrepreneurial action, such as
entrepreneurial self-efficacy and the fear of upsetting important oth-
ers [Mitchell and Shepherd, 2011]. The importance of the contextual
landscape when examining fear of failure is echoed in more recent arti-
cles — Morgan and Sisak [2016, p. 13] maintain that the impact fear of
failure has on success depends greatly on context, in particular the “self-
created context of individual aspirations”. More generally Wennberg
et al. [2013] argue that the broader cultural contexts individuals are
embedded in are important to consider.
Morgan and Sisak [2016] theorize that fear of failure can be motivat-
ing particularly when the individual is already in entrepreneurship and
their success standards are sufficiently high. Alternatively they warn
that those with lower aspirations may see their fear of failure corroding
motivation. Duality of the concept was also touched on by Cacciotti
and Hayton [2015] who posit that for individuals high in fear of failure
two outcomes exist — the individual chooses to engage in safe tasks
where the likelihood of failure is reduced or he or she engages in dif-
ficult tasks where failure can be attributed to external circumstances.
Meanwhile Mitchell and Shepherd [2011] contend that entrepreneurs
facing higher risk are more likely to have a higher fear of failure. In
a similar vein Morgan and Sisak [2016] hypothesize that those suc-
ceeding in entrepreneurship may suffer more from fear of failure than
the general entrepreneur population with higher aspirations likely to
produce more success. However they also postulate that fear of failure
deters entrepreneurship and those entering entrepreneurship are likely
to suffer less from fear of failure. These findings appear somewhat oxy-
moronic, yet they are important as they dispute the generally accepted
principle that fear of failure is an impediment to entrepreneurship.
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Thus these nuanced findings highlight that the previously accepted
relationship between fear of failure and withdrawal/avoidance is not
entirely accurate. Myopia in the entrepreneurship literature regarding
the potential positive aspects of fear of failure has gone largely uncon-
tested, yet caution is urged before wholly dismissing it as an entirely
negative construct [Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015]. A propagator of the
viewpoint that fear of failure has a negative impact on entrepreneur-
ship may derive from the prominence of GEM data [see Cacciotti and
Hayton, 2015] within studies exploring the concept [Minniti and Nar-
done, 2007, Wennberg et al., 2013]. The phrasing of the response choice
within the panel study (“fear of failure would prevent me from starting
a business”) has been criticized the single-item measure as “mislead-
ing” and suggestive of a “negative relationship between the perception
of fear and the decision to start” [Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015, p. 170]. It
focuses on adverse effects rather than potential benefits and as a result
the majority of studies in the area focus on one’s decision whether or
not to start a business [Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015].
A further potential discrepancy with research on the construct to
date stems from the lack of distinction between fear of failure as a
trait/disposition versus a state. Whilst a trait approach indicates a
stable disposition towards fear of failure, independent of specific char-
acteristics, a state approach considers behavior as the result of psycho-
logical processes induced by situational characteristics [Cacciotti and
Hayton, 2015]. Cacciotti and Hayton [2015] suggest that viewing fear
of failure as a state rather than a trait is more conducive to explaining
the dualistic nature of fear of failure, wherein some dimensions of the
concept induce entrepreneurial action whilst others deter it [Mitchell
and Shepherd, 2011]. A definition of the concept gleamed from Conroy
[2001] within the social psychology literature is useful for conceptual-
izing fear of failure as a state, where fear of failure is the appraisal
of threats during situations that involve the possibility of failing. For
a more expansive analysis of the concept of fear of failure within the
entrepreneurship literature see Cacciotti and Hayton’s [2015] compre-
hensive review on the topic. Table 4.5 outlines a selection of prominent
contemporary papers on fear.
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Table 4.5: Fear and business failure.
Author(s) Key findings
Morgan and Sisak
[2016]
The role fear of failure plays in the decision to become an
entrepreneur and subsequent investment decisions are modeled.
The impact fear of failure has on outcomes depends on context.
Results suggest that fear of failure is negatively associated with
entrepreneurship entry. Yet if the entrepreneur is already engaged
in entrepreneurship then fear of failure is motivating for highly
ambitious individuals and demotivating for those less ambitious.
Thus the interaction between fear of failure and entrepreneurial
aspirations is important to understand in order to determine its
effect on behavior.
Wennberg et al.
[2013]
Similarly this paper also stresses the importance of context. The
cultural traits of institutional collectivism and uncertainty
avoidance in a country moderate the impact fear of failure has on
entrepreneurial entry. In societies with high uncertainty avoidance
the negative effect of fear of failure on entry is more pronounced.
Furthermore the level of performance orientation slightly moderates
how one’s fear of failure impacts his or her likelihood of
entrepreneurial entry. In societies with high performance orientation
the negative effect of fear of failure on entry is more pronounced.
Mitchell and
Shepherd [2010]
Fear of failure impacts entrepreneurial decision makers’ images of
opportunity. Those with a higher fear of failure place greater
importance on the potential value when deciding on entrepreneurial
action than those with lower fear of failure. Furthermore those with
higher fear of failure place less importance on the number of
potential opportunities available when deciding on likelihood of
action than those with lower fear of failure. Essentially fear of
failure seems to result in an increased emphasis on the
internally-focused desirability components of opportunities, and a
decreased emphasis on certain externally-focused environmental
aspects. Thus entrepreneurs with a higher fear of failure may be
less likely to distinguish between the benefits of alternative
opportunities in the environment. Therefore this may provide the
key as to why some entrepreneurs explore many opportunities while
others only a few — the answer may lie in variations in fear of
failure as an image of vulnerability.
Arenius and
Minniti [2005]
Fear of failure is significantly negatively correlated with nascent
entrepreneur. Results from the GEM data used in this study show
that those who fear of failure are only two thirds as likely to
become entrepreneurs as those who do not fear it.
(Continued)
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Table 4.5: (Continued)
Author(s) Key findings
Mitchell and
Shepherd [2011]
Fear of failure moderates the effects of human capital, general
self-efficacy and entrepreneurial self-efficacy on likelihood of
entrepreneurial action (with these effects differing based on fear of
failure dimensions). 127 decision makers participated in the study
from 240 randomly selected companies from a list of 459. Through
exploration of the three dimensions of failure it is found that some
sources of fear (such as the interaction between specific human
capital and fear of devaluing self and the interaction for general
self-efficacy and fear of having an uncertain future) have an
inhibitory impact of entrepreneurial action whilst other dimensions
of fear of failure interact and propel entrepreneurial action (the
interaction between general self-efficacy and the fear of devaluing
one’s self, the interaction between specific human capital and the
fear of upsetting important others, and the interaction between
entrepreneurial self-efficacy and the fear of upsetting important
others).
Wyrwich et al.
[2016]
Observing entrepreneurs reduces fear of failure in others,
particularly in environments where approval of entrepreneurs is
high. The effect is significantly weaker in low-approval
environments. As such the paper argues that fear of failure is
formed through a specific process that is influenced by social
interactions with entrepreneurs in the local environment. Using
German GEM data for 5 years (2003–2006; 2008) the study
integrated German history and the social and institutional
contexts. Ultimately, the sample comprised of 6,457 West Germans
and 1,598 East Germans.
For more papers on this topic see Cacciotti and Hayton’s [2015] review.
4.4 The impact of failure
Business failure does not happen in a vacuum; the inter-related tapestry
of commerce means that the effects of failure may spillover from one’s
professional life and impact one’s personal life. It can “have a seri-
ous and detrimental impact on numerous aspects of an entrepreneur’s
life” [Cope, 2011, p. 610]. As previously discussed, exit and failure
can result in the positive consequence of tailored learning for the
entrepreneur; however, disengaging from the firm may induce nega-
tive effects particularly for entrepreneurs with higher psychological
ownership [Pierce et al., 2001; Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014]. The
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way in which failure is interpreted in terms of damage to one’s self-
esteem and financial loss has ramifications on how an entrepreneur
feels following the failure experience [Jenkins et al., 2014]. One of the
ways entrepreneurs may continue to encounter difficulties after firm
failure is through stigmatization. This will be examined further in this
section of the monograph.
4.4.1 Stigma
Societal views on failure vary according to cultural and geographical
settings [Damaraju et al., 2010, Landier, 2005]. Even within U.S. bor-
ders tolerance of business failure ranges from general tolerance “in Sil-
icon Valley to the abhorrence of it on more conservative Wall Street”
[Cardon et al., 2011, p. 80]. The perceptions that exist towards failure
in a culture may have profound effects on the allocation of resources.
If failure is deemed intolerable the associated stigma of business col-
lapse may spill over into personal and social stigmas, resulting in
entrepreneurs being less inclined to pursue entrepreneurial ventures
[Cardon et al., 2011]. Stigma is “a quality of social dishonor: a mark
of degradation, loss of esteem, or loss of reputation” [Spicker, 1984,
p. 159], it negatively impacts one’s image [Goffman, 1963]. Stigmati-
zation is emotionally difficult but beyond internal feelings it also has
the potential to reduce the resources and compensation one can com-
mand subsequently [Wiesenfeld et al., 2008, Aldrich and Fiol, 1994,
Sutton and Callahan, 1987]. For those that experience business failure,
stigmatization is the resultant stain on one’s image and character due
to one’s direct association with the firm’s demise [Wiesenfeld et al.,
2008, Achtenhagen, 2002].
According to Ucbasaran et al. [2010] the context in which failure
occurs is important as it may influence how the entrepreneur responds
to failure. The literature on stigma shows that context also influences
how others in society respond to failure. If a society deems failure as
wholly negative, observers may place all penalties for the failure on
the entrepreneur [McGrath, 1999] reducing the incentive to engage in
entrepreneurial efforts [Cardon et al., 2011]. Stigmatization is a social
228 Business Failure in the Entrepreneurship Literature
process, whereby the person with the offending attribute (such as asso-
ciation with a failed firm) is denigrated [Wiesenfeld et al., 2008]. There-
fore to better understand if business failure leads to stigmatization of
an entrepreneur, and the extent to which this may occur, one first needs
to understand the cultural view of failure in the respective community
[Cardon et al., 2011]. It is generally accepted that the lower the cultures’
acceptance of failure the greater the potential of stigmatization one is
subjected to following a failure experience. Furthermore business failure
in individualist cultures may be more likely to be professionally forgiven
[Petzinger, 1997] whilst in collectivistic cultures the social stigma can be
devastating [McGrath, 1999, Cardon et al., 2011]. Yet studies in China
(a collectivist culture) found failure to be well tolerated in some parts
of the country [Wong, 2003]. Ultimately Cardon et al. [2011] confirm
that cultural interpretations of failure are important as they impact the
level of entrepreneurial behavior within a community. A study by Sim-
mons et al. [2014] found that in high-stigma countries, entrepreneurs
are less likely to re-enter self-employment following a failure experience.
Additionally if the societal response to failure is stigmatization learning
and spillover effects are diminished [McGrath, 1999]. Conversely coun-
tries with lower stigma attached to failure may make recovery easier
[Simmons et al., 2014, Jenkins et al., 2014]. It may be “that the psy-
chological costs of business failure are lower and reduced more quickly
in social contexts that are more forgiving of failure” [Ucbasaran et al.,
2013, p. 194]. If failure is normalized the emotional aversion to it is
removed, allowing entrepreneurs to move on faster as negative emo-
tions are neutralized [Shepherd et al., 2009b]. A culture where failure
is accepted or at the least not stigmatized removes a significant barrier
to learning. A system where it is better not to fail rather than succeed
is blamed for a lack of innovation [Tezuka, 1997].
Society also recognizes that the influence of leaders on organiza-
tional outcomes is immense [Rowe, 2001, Yukl, 2008, Hambrick and
Mason, 1984]. Thus, leaders are a prominent target when forming assig-
nations regarding organizational outcomes whether said assignations
are valid or not [Wiesenfeld et al., 2008]. Leaders of organizations’
are seen as the formal decision-making authority within a firm, they
are also the ones with the highest concentration of power and have
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access to large quantities of information, this allows them to make
informed choices and guide the organization appropriately [Finkelstein,
1992; Argenti, 1976]. As such stigmatization is most profound for those
deemed to be in charge, the higher one’s position of power within
an organization, the greatest downward settling-up one’s experiences
[Wiesenfeld et al., 2008]. Shunning is an effect of stigmatization that an
entrepreneur may experience following a failure experience, it occurs
when important others visibly withdraw and reject interaction with the
stigmatized individual. A shunning experience is both professionally
and economically damaging for the entrepreneur and can lead to a neg-
ative spiral as an entrepreneur that is shunned will also find it increas-
ingly difficult to retain and form other relationships in the same social
sphere, thus further denigrating their identity [Wiesenfeld et al., 2008].
Social capital is one factor that can help mitigate the effects of failure
stigmatization, people with “high levels of social capital, prestige, and
status may be buffered from personal stigma because their social cap-
ital alters the ways that observers react to them” [Wiesenfeld et al.,
2008, p. 240]. Bolstered by a strong supportive network entrepreneurs
bounce back faster from firm collapse as society is reluctant to label
favored individuals with negative characteristics such as ineptness and
self-servitude [Wiesenfeld et al., 2008]. Thus, entrepreneurs with a
strong and diverse network are buffered from the ill effects of firm
failure as their social capital is likely to present them with a favor-
able forum through which they can defend themselves and reinstate, to
some degree, their social standing, this in turn allows the entrepreneurs
to mitigate the effects of stigmatization [Wiesenfeld et al., 2008, Adler
and Kwon, 2002].
Stigmatization has traditionally been viewed as a potential conse-
quence of failure [Cardon et al., 2011]. However, the process by which
stigmatization occurs has been called into question by Singh et al.
[2015]; they found that stigmatization surfaces before failure occurs,
when the entrepreneur is anticipating failure. This anticipation leads
the entrepreneur to engage in behavior destructive to the firm, in an
effort to evade further stigma. Hence stigma actually contributes to
business failure and in turn increases stigmatization of entrepreneurs
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that have experienced failure [Singh et al., 2015]. Table 4.6 presents
some of the key papers exploring stigma in the management and
entrepreneurship literature.
4.5 Literature related to recovery from failure
Actively moving on from failure is an essential part of the recovery pro-
cess [Cope, 2011]. A study of European entrepreneurs estimates that
approximately 15% of entrepreneurs have prior entrepreneurial experi-
ence [Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas, 2007]. Although not all entrepreneurs
re-entering entrepreneurship have experienced failure it remains
generally accepted in the literature that “all entrepreneurs irrespective
of whether they succeeded or failed in their first venture, are more likely
to start another venture than novice entrepreneurs” [Nielsen and Saras-
vathy, 2011, p. 7]. Thus recovery is an important stage for entrepreneurs
to proceed through in order to emerge from the failure process into a
position where re-entry is a viable and real option.
Studies show that industry experience is an important predic-
tor of firm success for new venture founders [Agarwal et al., 2004,
Chatterji, 2009, Phillips, 2002, Klepper and Sleeper, 2005]. Although
many of these studies primarily focus on prior industry experience
attained through previous employment it does not negate or dimin-
ish the potential for the same effect occurring when we consider
prior entrepreneurial experience [Eggers and Song, 2015]. A recent
study by Toft-Kehler et al. [2014] examined geographic and tempo-
ral domain similarities in subsequent ventures, in addition to indus-
try. The research shows that prior experience can negatively affect
performance among novice entrepreneurs, whilst expert entrepreneurs
experience positive performance returns; high context similarity (geo-
graphic, industry or temporal) serves to weaken the negative relation-
ship between experience and performance for novice entrepreneurs, and
it strengthens the positive relationship between experience and perfor-
mance for those with moderate to high levels of experience (Toft-Kehler
et al., 2014). In addition to prior experience numerous other factors
influence recovery, understandably learning is an essential component.
4.5. Literature related to recovery from failure 231
Table 4.6: Stigma and business failure.
Author(s) Key findings
Simmons et al.
[2014]
Failed entrepreneurs employ tactics to manage stigma and respond
to lost legitimacy. Cross-national differences in stigma attitudes and
regulatory stigma symbols influence failed entrepreneurs’ decisions
to start-up again, in addition to affecting modes of re-entry.
Singh et al. [2015] Stigma is explored at an individual level through narratives.
Stigmatization is a process that unfolds over time. The process
begins at the anticipating failure stage and consequently contributes
to venture demise as entrepreneurs engage in harmful behavior as a
means to avoid stigma. Stigmatization triggers deep personal
insights, which have the potential to transform entrepreneurs’ view
of failure from a very negative, to a positive, life experience.
Wiesenfeld et al.
[2008]
A model is developed to explain how corporate failure results in the
devaluation of individuals associated with the failed firm.
Stigmatization is a social process whereby an individual with an
offending attribute is denigrated. Organisational actors can avoid or
acquire negative reputations through their behavior before, during,
and after the failure process.
Sutton and
Callahan [1987]
When an organisation files for Chapter 11 (bankruptcy in the
United States) the stigma of such an action elicits five negative
reactions from key organisational audiences: disengagement,
reduction in the quality of participation, bargaining for more
favorable exchange relationships, denigration via rumor and
denigration via confrontation. Organisational leaders engage five
methods to counter this stigma: concealing, defining, denying
responsibility, accepting responsibility, and withdrawing.
Landier [2005] Landier creates an economic model of entrepreneurship based on
two regimes — conservative and experimental. In a conservative
culture entrepreneurs will pursue suboptimal, but safe projects —
thus stigma affects the type of project entrepreneurs undertake.
The stigma of failure also affects entrepreneurs’ continuation and
abandonment decisions. Conservatism makes abandonment less
attractive to entrepreneurs, whilst in an experimental equilibrium
entrepreneurs fail more often and the higher levels of
experimentation lead to the creation of more high prospect firms.
Ferrer and Dew
[2010]
The economic models of six cases describing different
entrepreneurial scenarios are introduced as a means of exploring
corporate entrepreneurship. The study builds on Landier’s [2005]
model and shows that the extent to which a culture stigmatizes
failure can be modeled as a relatively simple information
asymmetry problem. In order to be innovative, companies need a
forgiving culture that encourages experimentation and accepts
success and failure as part of its journey towards superior
operational performance.
(Continued)
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Table 4.6: (Continued)
Author(s) Key findings
Efrat [2006] Reform of Japan’s legislation has reduced the entrenched stigma of
bankruptcy. Profound manifestations of bankruptcy stigmatization
led individuals to petition for name changes in some cases and in
others to have the bankruptcy petitions’ dismissed completed. The
legislative changes have lessened the legal ramifications of
bankruptcy and the paper suggests that such action also reduces
the stigmatization of failure in society generally.
Kirkwood [2007] ‘Tall poppy syndrome’ the practice of knocking high achievers is
regarded as being engrained in New Zealand’s culture and
discourages restart following a business failure experience. However
the extent of stigmatization, and the potential of reputational
reparation, is influenced by whether the failure is due to external
circumstances or a result of the entrepreneur’s actions.
Cope et al. [2004] Venture capitalists are tolerant of failure. It is not an automatic
‘black mark’, they are sympathetic to the pitfalls of venture
start-up. Some failures may even be categorized as relatively
successful such as getting an exit in times of market turbulence.
Essentially the decision to invest in an entrepreneur is not
negatively impacted by prior failure experience.
Success and failure bring different learning outcomes, learning from
failure is more difficult as it requires the entrepreneurs to acknowledge
and accept their role in the firms’ demise. Learning from failure and
recovering from failure are two sides of the same coin [Cope, 2011, Jenk-
ins, 2012]. When the failure is properly attributed and the individual
engages in the sensemaking experience in an emotionally honest way,
the learning process is efficient and effective. However balance is criti-
cal, prolonged retrospective analysis and self-criticism is unproductive,
the entrepreneur must actively move on from the failure for recovery to
complete [Cope, 2011]. Individuals with an optimistic outlook recover
quickly from setbacks as they transform problems into opportunities
[Ucbasaran et al., 2013, Seligman, 2006].
The concept of recovery has elicited various opinions. Ucbasaran
et al. [2013] argue that the concept is restrictive. Recovery, they argue,
implies overcoming the financial costs of business failure without rec-
ognizing or considering the long-term financial benefits gained through
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pursuit of competing entrepreneurial ventures. Yet Cope’s [2011] vision
is more holistic, recovery is not simply a process confined to the
entrepreneur. The rehabilitation of the entrepreneur is “a function
of observing the recovery of significant others” [Cope, 2011, p. 613].
Recovery in this case is part of a social and cultural process that
enables the entrepreneurs to make sense of their situation based on the
experiences of others. From this perspective the way society approaches
failure is important. Numerous successful entrepreneurs once endured
failure, this information can be heralded as a sign of triumph over
adversity or it may remain a quiet vestige of the entrepreneurs’ ear-
lier careers. For example, U.S. entrepreneurs Henry Ford, Bill Gates,
R.H. Macy, F.W. Woolworth and Walt Disney have all experienced
failure prior to their extremely successful entrepreneurial careers; this
is openly discussed in the media. Conversely, examples of European
entrepreneurs are notably absent [Frankish et al., 2013] as well as their
Asian counterparts. This is considered part of the culture of stigma that
traditionally permeates these continents [Frankish et al., 2013]. This
perceived intolerance of failure in Europe and Asia has been attributed
to stringent bankruptcy legislation and restrictions to restarting [Efrat,
2006, Singh et al., 2015, Landier, 2005]. Thus whilst recovery from fail-
ure lies, for a large part with the entrepreneur — their cognitive, affec-
tive and behavioral responses to the phenomena, it also lies in part to
the social, cultural and legislative environments within which the fail-
ure occurs. Therefore recovery is not guaranteed and following a failure
experience “many individuals move toward recovery, while others find
themselves in a paralysis or downward spiral” [Boss and Sims Jr, 2008,
p. 136]. In Table 4.7 additional research not presented in previous sec-
tions but relevant to recovery from business failure are outlined.
4.5.1 Costs of business failure
When a firm fails there are associated tangible and intangible costs for
the entrepreneur to bear, economic, social, psychological and phys-
iological [Singh et al., 2007, Latack et al., 1995]. Yet according to
McGrath [1999] once the cost of failing is bounded, high failure rates
can be favourable, as they indicate economic vibrancy. Whilst McGrath
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Table 4.7: Recovery and business failure.
Author(s) Key findings
Boss and Sims
Jr [2008]
The recovery process following business failure can be enhanced
through emotional regulation and self-leadership. Emotional regulation
and self-leadership impact an individual’s behavioral responses and
have the potential to mitigate damage caused by failure, to an
individual’s self-efficacy. This in turn has a consequential effect on
recovery from a failure experience.
Ucbasaran
et al. [2003]
The extent to which entrepreneurs translate prior business experience
into higher subsequent entrepreneurial performance is dependent on
cognition and learning. Two categories of cognition are highlighted:
heuristic-based (automatic) thinking and systematic (rational)
thinking. Entrepreneurial cognition is often heuristics-based thinking,
it can facilitate the identification and exploitation of entrepreneurial
opportunities. However it may lead to errors and biases in
decision-making (e.g. over-confidence). Systematic thinking can
overcome some of these biases, however it is slow and requires effort.
An entrepreneur’s ability to reflect and evaluate their experiences is
critical in determining their future performance.
Cope [2011] This study employs inductive analysis to examine recovery and
re-emergence from failure. It explores the learning processes that
enable healing. Three interconnected phases are proposed. First, the
initial hiatus, whereby the entrepreneur psychologically removes
himself or herself from the failure in order to heal. Secondly, critical
reflection, the stage at which the entrepreneur focuses on making sense
of the failure. Thirdly, reflective action, where the entrepreneur
attempts to move on from the experience and explore other
opportunities. The final recovery stage is referred to as “higher order”
restoration as it involves the entrepreneur re-engaging in the
entrepreneurial process and is associated with repeat entrepreneurship.
The paper also provides a detailed account of papers specifically
exploring recovery and learning from failure.
Eggers and
Song [2015]
This paper explores the changes entrepreneurs implement in their
subsequent ventures due to their experience of failure with a previous
venture. Specifically it deals with the idea that a failure experience will
lead serial entrepreneurs to make changes to their future business.
Attribution is used to frame the study. Entrepreneurs whose previous
venture has failed are more likely to change industries in subsequent
ventures. However changing industry is detrimental to subsequent
venture performance as entrepreneurs are subject to penalties from
switching industries. Furthermore prior failure has no significant
relationship with changes in business strategy, planning or the
management decision-making process. Thus changes made by
entrepreneurs in subsequent ventures following a failure experience are
more likely to be changes that relate to the external environment
(industry) rather than changes of factors within the entrepreneurs
control (strategy).
4.5. Literature related to recovery from failure 235
Table 4.8: Costs of business failure.
Author(s) Key findings
Arora and
Nandkumar
[2011]
This paper analyses how entrepreneurial opportunity cost, conditions
performance. Firms with high opportunity cost (i.e. those with
numerous viable alternatives to the focal venture) are more impatient
for success and willing to accept greater risks. They put less value on
surviving, care less about failure and invest more aggressively. They
are both more likely to fail and more likely to succeed. If failure occurs
it may result in considerable financial loss but the availability of
alternatives allows them to absorb the costs more readily. Conversely
those with fewer outside alternatives will adopt less aggressive
strategies and linger for longer.
Van Auken
et al. [2009].
Bankruptcy legislation can impact entrepreneurial behavior. Laws can
provide protection for entrepreneurs against total loss of personal
assets (e.g. the entrepreneur’s residence) should bankruptcy occur.
Better understanding is needed for the impact bankruptcy policy has
on start-up decisions.
Dew et al.
[2009]
This paper explores how entrepreneurs seek to reduce the financial
costs of failure through use of the affordable loss principle. Affordable
loss decision heuristic involves decision-makers calculating what they
are willing to lose in order to follow a particular course of action. It
differs from the expected return approach (NPV) to assessing
investment decisions. When decisions are taken based on expected
returns entrepreneurs overinvest or underinvest, with performance
depending heavily on prediction accuracy. However with affordable loss
reasoning entrepreneurs’ investments can grow as a function of survival
through incremental investments based on affordable loss reasoning.
Should failure occur, entrepreneurs using affordable loss are almost
always likely to lose less than prediction-oriented entrepreneurs. Thus,
affordable loss reduces the cost of failure, irrespective of the
probability of failure.
McGrath [1999] Real options theory is employed to explore reasoning concerning
entrepreneurial failure. Real options emphasises managing uncertainty
through pursuit of high-variance outcomes and only investing in
favourable conditions. Such an approach allows for an increase in profit
potential and management of costs. Such reasoning enables failing
entrepreneurs to choose the best rate at which to exit, by exploring the
generative capacity of alternative options.
Singh et al.
[2007]
This paper details four key aspects of an entrepreneur’s life affected by
entrepreneurial failure — economic, social, psychological and
physiological. The paper adds to the literature through the
identification of the physiological costs of failure. Panic attacks, weight
loss, anxiety and exhaustion are all detailed as physiological effects of
failure.
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[1999] puts forth a compelling argument for containing economic costs
through consistent awareness of a firm’s opportunity costs of continua-
tion, the intangible costs of failure can be more complex to discern. The-
ories of commitment have been employed to argue that entrepreneurs
may attempt to stave of the effects of failure by escalating commit-
ment to a failing course of action [Shepherd et al., 2009b]. Ironically
such action only serves to increase the costs of failure when it even-
tually plays out. One interesting benefit of such behavior (previously
explored in this monograph in Section 4.3.1) stems from the opportu-
nity delaying the failure gives to the entrepreneur to acclimatise to the
oncoming failure. The entrepreneur can then make the necessary men-
tal adjustments to positively cope with its onset. However Shepherd
et al. [2009b] advise balance in relation to delaying the inevitable as a
business in a permanent state of failing result is a strain on the econ-
omy [McGrath, 1999] whilst simultaneously eroding the entrepreneur’s
professional profile. Furthermore the longer the failing venture is arti-
ficially prolonged the greater the opportunity costs.
The emotional cost of failure is closely linked to its social costs,
failure may lead to a severance of ties between the entrepreneur and
the community of collaborators the firm’s existence allowed access to
[Cope, 2011]. If an individual attaches his or her self worth to a ven-
ture that subsequently fails, the emotional costs of that failure may be
further aggravated through the loss of self esteem [Crocker and Wolfe,
2001]. In such a situation the failure would be viewed as a personal as
well as a professional failure [Jenkins et al., 2014]. Once again this affect
in response to business failure is guided not only by the entrepreneur’s
personal feelings but also by society’s attitude to failure. An individu-
alistic culture, such as the United States where failure is “professionally
forgiven”, will have less negative repercussions than collectivist Japan.
The strain business failure can put on individuals’ personal lives is also
touched on in the literature. Marriage breakdowns [Singh et al., 2007]
and an erosion of close relationships [Cope, 2011] due to feelings of
shame, guilt and impotence is further evidence of the spill-over effect
failure can have on the personal lives of entrepreneurs (see Table 4.8
for further research on the cost of business failure).
5
Methodological Approaches, Biases and
Perspectives
One of the acknowledged challenges of conducting empirical research
on business failure is securing access to appropriate data for analysis
and ensuring data validity. In this section an overview of the method-
ological approaches commonly used in research and analysis of business
failure is provided. As outlined and discussed in this monograph busi-
ness failure has been investigated through a range of lenses, resulting in
a dynamic and vibrant array of studies and methodological approaches.
However, such varied strands of ideas and methodologies can, in the
words of Pfeffer [1993], lead to “a weed-patch, rather than a well tended
garden”. The methodological challenges are further confounded by the
lack of a universally accepted definition of business failure.
Business failure research began in earnest following the 1930s eco-
nomic depression. The growing prevalence of commercial banks was
the source of useful financial data that became the foundation of initial
studies. Given the economic hardship imposed by the great depression,
many studies were concerned with predicting failure in advance through
analysis of organisations’ accounts. This gave rise to financial analy-
sis of firm accounts and the emergence of financial ratios. The iden-
tification of ratios provided a basis for distinction between financially
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healthy and potentially unhealthy firms through simple accounting cal-
culations. Over time the growing amount of available data resulted in
simple financial ratios evolving into complex statistical models. Since
the 1980s the advancement of information technology has resulted in
the development of technology-driven models, yet these new models
still rely on a statistical heritage [Aziz and Dar, 2006]. Contempo-
rary prediction models incorporate artificial intelligence and combine
human knowledge with generated machine knowledge. The newest of
these models is artificial intelligence expert systems (AIES) reaching
bankruptcy prediction accuracy rates of 88%, yet this model and its
predecessors are not without criticism, as discussed in Section 3.1.1
[Aziz and Dar, 2006].
Whilst the finance and accounting fields were focusing on improv-
ing their models’ predictable abilities through information technology
in the 1980s, management theorists began developing organisational
decline models [Adler and Chaston, 2002]. These models differ greatly
from prediction models; they are not concerned with predicting fail-
ure before its onset but with charting the stages of failure as it pro-
gresses through the business. Also unlike the large datasets employed
for prediction models, organisational decline models employed smaller
datasets (see Table 3.2); some emerged from a single case-study [Shep-
pard and Chowdhury, 2005] whilst others adopt a matched-pairs tech-
nique totalling multiples of ten [Moulton et al., 1996]. The primary
objective of these studies is to understand the process nature of failure
through the perspective of the management team. The data used to
develop the decline models was often gleamed from public sources; as
such the firms that were the focus of these studies were often large
organisations [see Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988, Sheppard and Chowd-
hury, 2005, Fridenson, 2004].
The deterministic perspective evolved from economic theory. Incor-
porating organisational ecology and industrial organisation viewpoints,
large datasets (in some cases whole industries: Barnett and Amburgey,
1990 — the Pennsylvania telephone industry; Tushman and Ander-
son, 1986 — US minicomputer, cement and airline industries; Sutton,
1991 — US frozen food industry) are analysed. Emerging patterns
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provide information about entry and exit rates. Yet this approach
assumes exit, closure, discontinuance and disappearance are synony-
mous with failure whilst survival is considered a synonym for suc-
cess [Khelil, 2016]. Such assumptions are unreasonable for numerous
reasons (as discussed in Section 2.1), firms disappear due to owners
retiring, selling their firm or changing to a different venture [Watson
and Everett, 1996]. Discontinuance does not equate to failure given
the many positive factors that lead to firm closure [Justo et al., 2015,
Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014, Khelil, 2016, Walsh and Cunningham,
2015]. Furthermore, persistently underperforming firms are excluded
from this definition even though they may consume more resources
than they create [Khelil, 2016]. The voluntaristic perspective provides
balance to the myopia of the deterministic approach.
The voluntaristic perspective argues that many firms are subject to
the same environmental conditions yet some fail whilst others thrive.
They argue that it is those making decisions within a firm holds more
power than the external environment in which the decision is being
made. This perspective is shaped by organisational psychology and
organisational studies theorists and is comprised of many mid-range
theories (as discussed in Section 3.3.2). Despite lacking an overarching
theory the essential premise of the perspective is that failure occurs due
to internal inadequacies in dealing with external threats. Management’s
perceptions of a situation is coloured by their feeling, experiences and
motivations and these factors combine to dictate the way they respond
to organisational crisis. This perspective highlights the centrality of
management’s intellectual, emotional and professional skill sets to the
success and continuation of firms and gives space for softer, individual-
level factors to be explored. Focusing on individual-level factors opened
up the field to entrepreneurship academics and business failure research
in the field has been growing for the past two decades. The global
economic downturn in 2008 further ignited interest in business failure
studies and it remains a popular field of study.
Business failure studies in the entrepreneurship literature cover
a range of topics including — learning [Cope, 2011], grief [Jenkins
et al., 2014], sensemaking [Byrne and Shepherd, 2015], fear [Morgan
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and Sisak, 2016], stigma [Singh et al., 2015, Simmons et al., 2014],
recovery [Ucbasaran et al., 2013] and costs [Singh et al., 2007]. The
emotional and social aspects of failure have resulted in theories and con-
cepts being introduced into the entrepreneurship literature from social
psychology, providing insights into the human element of business fail-
ure. An interesting characteristic of failure research within the field of
entrepreneurship is the popularity of qualitative research methods and
case-study research [Cope, 2011, Byrne and Shepherd, 2015, Mantere
et al., 2013]. The prevalence of qualitative research methods speaks
to the novel and innovative concepts under investigation. There is a
notable contrast between the approaches and methodologies engaged
to explore the phenomenon of business failure within entrepreneur-
ship, and the financially driven models that prevailed in the finance
and accounting literature when the topic first came under academic
scrutiny. As research continues, the complex and important nature
of the phenomenon, to both business and society, requires pluralistic
methodological approaches. However the first step to achieving this is
to attain a concrete understanding of the core facets of business failure
and its resultant impact on the entrepreneur and other stakeholders.
As such we argue for a concentration of research activity focused on
the individual and their failure experience (elaborated on in Section 6).
Table 5.1 highlights the business failure research trajectory in an
overview format.
5.1 Merits of methodologies
The lack of an accepted definition of business failure has created a
series of issues for research on the topic. The deficit not only clouds
comparisons between studies but also results in data-driven defini-
tions, whereby researchers choose the definition best suited for the
data they have access to. The constraining nature of such an approach
is troublesome in a field already noted for its dependence on large
data sources which many research groups ‘milk’, leading to a high
alpha error [Frese et al., 2012]. Furthermore, despite the dependence
on these large datasets little work is done on building new databases
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Table 5.1: Changes in research focus and methodologies.
Focus Data Sources Analysis
Bankruptcy Prediction Models
Studies in the fields of
accounting, finance
and information
technology create
models to predict
bankruptcy one or more
years before it occurs
Large datasets commonly
obtained from public
limited companies and
other public sources.
Highly Quantitative.
Ratio analysis, algorithms,
neural networks and artificial
intelligence expert systems
create predictions using a
combination of machine
learning and human intelligence
(see Table 3.2)
Organisational Decline Models
The field of general
management develops
process models to plot
the course of business
failure as a multi-stage,
longitudinal occurrence.
Focus mainly charts
failure in large firms
Mid-sized datasets (e.g.
73 matched pairs —
Moulton et al., 1996).
Data based on large firm
failures with accessible,
public information. Both
qualitative and
quantitative.
A selection of process models is
created with 3–5 stages which
chart the pattern of failure as it
proceeds through an
organisation (see Table 3.3)
Deterministic Perspective
Guided primarily by
economic theory this
approach explores
industry-level trends and
their influence on
start-up and exit rates
Large datasets are
employed encompassing
entire industries if
possible. Highly
quantitative.
Examining data for entire
industries over a period of
years/decades allows for
patterns to emerge which
present a perspective on
entrance and exit rates
Voluntaristic Perspective
Influenced by
organisational studies
and organisational
psychology firm-level
factors are explored as a
means of understanding
the origins of firm failure
Small datasets are used
concentrating primarily
on the CEO or
owner/manager to gain
insight into internal firm
activities. Both
qualitative and
quantitative.
The decisions and actions of
senior management are explored
in an effort to understand how
failure unfolded inside firms
Failure from an Entrepreneurship Perspective
Failure in the
entrepreneurship
literature has focused on
a range of cognitive,
affective and behavioral
aspects
Small, case-study
research dominants as
novel topics are explored.
Larger datasets are also
prevalent where more
established concepts are
investigated. Both
qualitative and
quantitative.
As the entrepreneur is the unit
of analysis research provides
insight into the softer aspects of
business failure. The effects
failure has both personally and
professionally is explored. Also
the impact of failure and
scrutinised using cultural and
legal lenses
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and exploring new techniques to analyse existing datasets [Frese et al.,
2012]. Quantitative approaches continue to have their merits within the
entrepreneurship field. They remain pertinent to progressing the field
and so secure is their place in the future of business failure research
that they do not require further discussion in this monograph. How-
ever some “questions simply do not get asked, or cannot be asked, when
undertaking quantitative studies” [Gartner and Birley, 2002, p. 388].
Thus, given the complex nature of the business failure process, quali-
tative research is still very much warranted. In recent years qualitative
studies have been instrumental in advancing understanding, and pro-
viding new perspectives into various facets of the phenomena. Whether
it is Cope’s [2011] insights on learning or the use of narratives to cap-
ture the complex impact the failure experience has on the individual
[Byrne and Shepherd, 2015, Mantere et al., 2013], qualitative research
remains meaningful. Such an approach may be particularly useful as
studies on failure begin to move past firm-level analysis and start to
focus on the individual at the heart of the failed business [Khelil, 2016].
To a certain extent the power of future quantitative studies rely on the
foundations built by current qualitative studies.
Numerous academics have called for more experiments in
entrepreneurship [Frese et al., 2012, Reay et al., 2009, Wieland et al.,
2016]. A content analysis conducted by Aguinis and Lawal [2012, p. 496]
of 175 empirical articles published in the Journal of Business Ventur-
ing between 2005 and 2010 found that “74.9% used non-experimental
designs, 10.3% were based on qualitative research, 8.6% used longitudi-
nal designs, 4.6% used quasi-experimental designs, and only 1.7% used
experimental designs.” As noted by Frese et al. [2012] when it comes to
interventions there are almost no controlled, randomized experiments
being done; most research in entrepreneurship is based on field studies,
which need to control for alternative explanations. The landscape is
slowly starting to change; a recent review found 40 articles in 29 aca-
demic journals publishing entrepreneurship research, which use experi-
mental methods to explore a range of entrepreneurship topics, between
2000 and 2015 [Wieland et al., 2016]. However each methodological
approach is not without challenge; for longitudinal and experimental
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designs the challenge is external validity, for quasi-experimental design
it is construct validity, for non-experimental design it is internal valid-
ity, and for qualitative research the challenges include internal, con-
struct and statistical conclusion validity [Scandura and Williams, 2000,
Aguinis and Lawal, 2012].
Business failure is a largely unknowable occurrence ex-ante; there-
fore it is common for studies to be conducted on the topic ex-post.
A key methodological concern with such a research design arises from
the issue of retrospective bias. Individuals are not only prone to biases
as a result of hindsight, memory or self-reporting errors, but as time
passes it is likely that the individual’s perspective of the event will also
adapt. This change is due in part to the sensemaking process, with
progress through the process varying from person to person. However,
despite these possible biases and potential errors, research conducted
on the failure process ex-post is still a fruitful avenue for investigation.
According to Cassar and Craig [2009, p. 150] “hindsight bias matters for
future nascent activity”. Similarly, attribution theorists argue that the
way in which an entrepreneur views their failure experience influences
how they respond to it and consequently their future career decisions.
Thus, whilst it is desirable to get a true perspective of the process of
failure, it is also meaningful to understand the full experience of the
entrepreneur even if their view is somewhat distorted.
“Field experimentation attempts to stimulate as closely as possi-
ble the conditions under which a causal process occurs” [Gerber and
Green, 2011, p. 2]. A challenge of field experimentation is the logis-
tical and practical issues of conducting them, particularly at a scale
sufficient enough for studying high-variance social phenomena [Chen
and Konstan, 2015, Aguinis and Lawal, 2012]. Natural experiments, on
the other hand, are the empirical study of individuals or firms that are
naturally exposed to either experimental or control conditions, whereby
the assignment of the condition is beyond the control of the researcher,
as such it is considered a natural assignment. External validity can be
a challenge for experimental designs [Aguinis and Lawal, 2012] partic-
ularly if the sample is not representative or if there is selection bias.
Longitudinal designs and natural experiments on the topic of failure
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can be difficult given the lack of ex-ante knowledge regarding failure;
however wisely selecting a particular industry can overcome some of
the ex-ante difficulties. Take for example the technology industry when
the providers of a new product are jockeying for position, it is known
ex-ante that some technological platforms will not survive (e.g. Blu-
ray disc versus DVD). Thus for certain types of research questions on
failure, such an industry conundrum can be a fruitful context for lon-
gitudinal designs or natural experiments.
Conducting a field experiment on business failure may raise ethical
concerns. For a field experiment not only is it essential to get informed
consent from the participant, but it is also important to understand the
affects of various potential treatments on the participants’ businesses.
As previously discussed by Frese et al. [2012], new methods of explor-
ing existing datasets are needed. Prior field experiments conducted on
firms with the intention to explore particular treatments, and their
impact, could be revisited to see whether the firms in the sample have
sustained or disbanded. Potentially, they could be contacted again ex-
post; such activity could serve to overcome the lack of longitudinal data
on the topic through utilizing the power of existing data by revisiting it
through the failure lens. Furthermore examining microcosms of failure
could provide further detail on individuals’ behaviors, responses and
attitudes to the experience; in this instance lab experiments could be
carried out using simulation programs to study one’s reactions to vari-
ous stimuli. Experiments of this variety are well established within the
psychology field, as such there is the opportunity for cross-pollination.
5.2 Limitations within the business failure literature
As evidenced by this review, the literature on the topic of business fail-
ure is eclectic. The phenomenon impacts many stakeholders in society
thus leading to the development of a multidisciplinary field. The various
perspectives and disciplines enrich our insight and broaden the scope of
research yet it also dilutes our knowledge. A key, and much discussed
issue regarding business failure studies arise from the lack of defini-
tion of the concept (see Section 2). This deficit hinders comparability
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between studies and adds noise to the field. A further limitation arises
from the lack of a founding theory on business failure. There is no gener-
ally accepted theory that encapsulates the phenomenon. The account-
ing and finance paradigm continue to explore bankruptcy prediction
modelling which with the integration of information technology has
become increasingly sophisticated. The general management literature
has tended to focus on exit [Burgelman, 1996; Hoetker and Agarwal,
2007] and turnaround strategies [O’Kane and Cunningham, 2013, 2014]
whilst the entrepreneurship literature has, in recent decades, begun to
examine the psychological manifestations of failure [Khelil, 2016]. The
research field is fragmented with many researchers failing to refer pre-
vious theories and studies, leading to a general lack of consensus on the
topic [Crutzen and Van Caillie, 2008].
A major issue within the business failure literature cited by Mellahi
and Wilkinson [2004, p. 31] is the assertion “virtually all such studies
are limited to one society, the US”. Whilst studies based in the US
continue to dominate the literature the past decade has somewhat alle-
viated this issue. Entrepreneurial failure studies based on data outside
of the US have been appearing in the Journal of Business Venturing
in recent years; these include research from the UK [Ucbasaran et al.,
2010, Cope, 2011], Tunisia [Khelil, 2016], Spain [Justo et al., 2015], Swe-
den [Jenkins et al., 2014, Wennberg et al., 2010], New Zealand [Singh
et al., 2015] and Northern Europe [Mantere et al., 2013]. The growing
prevalence of studies from other countries is a positive indication how-
ever the US context remains the most common setting for the majority
of failure studies. A possible reason for this is likely to stem from the
ease of access to data. As discussed the stigma around failure is less
pervasive in the US than in other countries making it an easier subject
to broach with entrepreneurs. Furthermore, large data pools gather-
ing and tracking entrepreneurial activity are more typical in the US
(e.g. Kauffman Firm Survey) and Northern European countries than
elsewhere which may also play a role in contextual setting of research
studies on the topic. On a positive note this trend is also changing as
the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), which orig-
inated at the University of Wisconsin, continues to be implemented
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in countries around the world. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) research initiatives also facilitate comparable data from
many countries around the world.
5.2.1 Retrospective biases
A clear limitation of business failure studies arises from the fact that
the phenomenon is rarely examined in real-time but mainly through
retrospective analysis. A real-time study of events is not appropriate
for studying an ex-post facto phenomenon, such as failure, according to
Sheppard and Chowdhury [2005]. As the event is explored in retrospect
it is more difficult to ensure that details of the failure are accurate and
true. The time dimension is important for a number of reasons, as fail-
ure takes hold the sensemaking process begins, this involves changes
in beliefs and actions over time Weick et al. [2005]. Failure is open to
multiple interpretations [Maitlis, 2005] and an individual’s perspective
changes as evidence supporting a particular viewpoint mounts; these
changes can be viewed as learning [Ucbasaran et al., 2013]. There-
fore the entrepreneur is likely to provide different responses, depending
on the extent of their learning from the sensemaking process, if they
are surveyed in the immediate aftermath of the failure as opposed to
months/years down the line. Furthermore, as much of the research
on business failure within the entrepreneurship context focuses on the
individual entrepreneur, biases may also arise from self-reporting. Such
retrospective reports may contain errors [Golden, 1992] due to respon-
dents’ motivations to influence the results, in addition to perceptual
and cognitive limitations of respondents [Shepherd, 2004]. Shepherd
[2004, p. 276] presented the example that entrepreneurs of failed firms
may seek “to diminish the role of emotions in order to appear more
‘rational”’. Studies within the entrepreneurship literature using attri-
bution theory have further elaborated on the debate, however consensus
has not been reached. Some studies [Mantere et al., 2013, Gaskill et al.,
1993, Zacharakis et al., 1999] detail entrepreneurs’ willingness to take
responsibility for business failure, whilst others [Rogoff et al., 2004,
Franco and Haase, 2010] found they avoid responsibility.
6
The Future of Business Failure Research within
the Entrepreneurship Literature
Exploration into the phenomenon of business failure within the
entrepreneurship field has just begun in earnest. The growth in qual-
itative research studies published in top tier journals [see Singh et al.,
2015, Khelil, 2016, Byrne and Shepherd, 2015, Mantere et al., 2013]
is a testament to the novel methodologies currently underpinning con-
temporary research in the field. It signals a resurgence of interest in the
field, resurgence is important as key facets of the phenomena are yet
to be understood. A flaw, cited recently by Khelil [2016], asserts that
much of the research on failure tends to be conducted at the firm level
rather than at the individual level. More research focusing on the indi-
viduals experiencing failure is needed. It is essential that individuals’
failure experiences are explored in varying organizational contexts —
start-ups, private firms, public sector organizations, non-profits/social
enterprises, universities, etc. Furthermore individuals’ affective, cog-
nitive and behavioral responses when confronted with business failure
need to be better explored. Entrepreneurship as a field is uniquely
positioned to provide fulfill these objectives. Individual-centric studies
have long been common within the entrepreneurship literature [De
Vries, 1977, Begley and Boyd, 1988, Herron and Robinson, 1993,
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Delmar and Davidsson, 2000]. This tradition of individual-focused
studies can further such studies on business failure during the different
stages of entrepreneurship, in a variety of profit and non-profit, sectoral
and country settings. Furthermore, the multidisciplinary concepts
necessary to examine the phenomenon of failure in detail are already
present within the entrepreneurship literature. Theories and models
from psychology [Shepherd, 2003, Cope, 2011], social psychology
[Ucbasaran et al., 2013, Cardon et al., 2011, Shepherd, 2009a] and
behavioral psychology [Morgan and Sisak, 2016, Singh et al., 2015,
Cardon et al., 2011, Ucbasaran et al., 2010] are integrated into the
field. In this section we outline some of the possible areas for future
research on business failure within the entrepreneurship literature.
6.1 Future research on attribution
The search for causes of failure has manifested, within the entrepreneur-
ship literature, into an examination of entrepreneurs’ causal ascriptions
for failure [Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015]. This has led to the adoption
of attribution theory into the discussion. Self-serving attribution bias
is inherent to attribution theory [Rogoff et al., 2004]. The bias occurs
due to an individual’s tendency to blame others for negative outcomes
whilst attributing positive outcomes to his or her own abilities. Studies
by Rogoff et al. [2004] and Franco and Haase [2010] found that the
bias exists amongst entrepreneurs, however entrepreneurship theorists
do not wholly accept it. Mantere et al. [2013] found no evidence of
its existence amongst entrepreneurs. Furthermore other studies have
found not only do entrepreneurs take responsibility for failure, but
also they are more likely to cite internal factors as the cause of the
failure than external factors [Gaskill et al., 1993, Zacharakis et al.,
1999]. This marked difference in results necessitates further analysis.
Some explanations for the difference have been offered — overconfi-
dent entrepreneurs tend to attribute their failure to external factors
[Busenitz and Barney, 1997, Eggers and Song, 2015], however taking
responsibility for failure can be a form of catharsis [Mantere et al.,
2013]. The way entrepreneurs’ attribute their firms’ failure is dependent
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on their individual characteristics, more research is needed to bet-
ter understand the connection between the individual’s perspective
and their resultant attributions. The effect entrepreneurs’ attributions
have on future actions also warrants investigation [Mandl et al., 2016].
Preliminary research shows that failure attributions influence future
action, however, the way in which they impact future action is, as of
yet, unclear [Mandl et al., 2016, Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015]. Studies
that examine failure attribution among serial, social, family and sci-
entific entrepreneurs may provide further insight into this link. Whilst
the role of gender in influencing future action has been explored to a
degree [Simmons and Wiklund, 2011, Levie et al., 2013] more stud-
ies are warranted as we understand more about the role of affect and
emotion in failure responses. Moreover studies contextualized in new
cultural settings would increase our understanding of the role cultural
dimensions [Simmons et al., 2014, Cardon et al., 2011] play in future
entrepreneurial action.
6.2 Future research on learning from failure
To date, a clear link has been established between failure attribu-
tions and consequential learning from the failure experience [Cope,
2011, Eggers and Song, 2015, Walsh and Cunningham, 2015]. Learning
from failure can be instrumental to future success. If entrepreneurs are
accepting their part in their firm’s failure, they can take steps to mini-
mize the influencing factor’s role in threatening future entrepreneurial
venturing. Much literature exists on the benefits of learning from fail-
ure [Cope, 2011, McGrath and Cardon, 1997, Schoemaker and Gunther,
2006, Ucbasaran et al., 2010]. To a lesser, but still impactful degree,
studies also detail the factors that impede or enhance learning, such as
culture [Simmons et al., 2014, Cardon et al., 2011] or social supports
[Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2011, Ucbasaran et al., 2013]. Learning is not
guaranteed or instantaneous [Shepherd, 2003] it is a process that as yet
remains unclear [Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015]. A measure for learning
outcomes from failure needs to be developed [Yamakawa and Cardon,
2015] and further clarity is required on how, if at all, a failure experience
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can increase an entrepreneur’s future likelihood of success. Further-
more, beyond learning from the aftermath of failure, more research is
needed in the years before potential failure occurs [Shepherd, 2004].
Equipping pre-nascent entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship students
with the techniques to recognize and cope with cognitive and affective
responses to failure is necessary to reduce anti-failure biases and the
stresses inherent to a failure experience [Shepherd, 2004]. Andrew Cor-
bett further stressed this perspective during his recent keynote speech
at the 2016 USASBE conference in San Diego. Thus, whilst learning
from failure is important, so to is learning (and teaching) how to fail. A
comparison research study or experiment that can explore, if, and how,
those who receive pre-nascent training/education on failure and those
who do not, differ affectively, cognitively, and/or behaviorally following
a subsequent failure experience would likely provide important insights
into the learning process.
6.3 Future research on emotion and failure
Research on affect in response to business failure has been one of the
more prolific topics within the entrepreneurship literature. Grief and
sensemaking have been explored through numerous studies [Jenkins
et al., 2014, Shepherd, 2009a,b, 2003, Shepherd et al., 2011, Cardon
et al., 2011, Wolfe and Shepherd, 2015]. Fear of failure has also come
under scrutiny [Morgan and Sisak, 2016, Mitchell and Shepherd, 2011,
Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015]; it is often portrayed as an impediment
to entrepreneurship and the positive, motivating aspects of the emo-
tion have been largely ignored within the entrepreneurship literature
[Morgan and Sisak, 2016]. Whilst we agree that the motivating aspects
of fear of failure have been largely under-explored within the busi-
ness failure literature, we argue that fear of failure, as a deterrent to
entrepreneurship, may be positive, in certain circumstances. When an
individual presents a healthy fear of failure, it may act as a valid screen-
ing tool. It is neither constructive nor conducive for nascent venturing
for entrepreneurs to pursue all, or even most opportunities that present.
Fear of failure can be used to gauge the quality of opportunities under
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consideration and the risks individuals are willing to take to pursue said
opportunities. Future research should also acknowledge and explore the
dualistic nature of fear of failure (e.g. individuals’ high in fear of fail-
ure may either engage in safe tasks with a low possibility of failure
or engage in difficult tasks where failure can be attributed to factors
beyond their control — Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015). Furthermore, dis-
tinction between fear of failure as a trait and as a state must also be
acknowledged. Fear of failure as a state aligns with the duality of the
concept, wherein fear of failure is the result of psychological processes
induced by situational characteristics [Mitchell and Shepherd, 2011,
Cacciotti and Hayton, 2015]. Whilst we concur that more studies on
the motivating nature of fear of failure are to be encouraged we also
urge researchers not to dismiss the positive aspect the inhibitive ele-
ment fear of failure also has (e.g. acting as a screening and prospective
risk tolerance tool).
6.4 Future research on recovery from failure
Stigma is another popular research strand on the topic of business
failure. Despite being regarded by some as a consequence of business
failure [Cardon et al., 2011], others [Singh et al., 2015] posit it surfaces
far sooner when entrepreneurs are anticipating failure. This leaves us
with a question as to the propagators of stigmatization as a result
of failure — how much is stigma a direct consequence of the failed
entrepreneur’s environment (cultural, social and legal context) and
how much is related to the individual’s self-fulfilling prophecy? An
entrepreneur’s attitude towards failure (even in the anticipation stage)
is shaped by the cultural, social and legal environment within which
the firm operates. However we argue that an individual has a level of
agency over the level of stigma they are confronted with, they can,
offset the potential costs of stigma with proactive behavior during
the anticipation stage. By this we mean strengthening links to social
influencers within their network, confronting the failure (withdrawing
due to shame or guilt is likely to increase stigmatization) and shaping
the failure story (during the anticipatory stage failing entrepreneurs
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have a chance to frame their failure narrative), if done appropriately
we argue that these actions can stymie stigmatization to a degree.
More research on the entrepreneur’s potential to mitigate the impact of
stigmatization and associated actions would shed light on the individ-
ual’s failure journey. It would provide balance to existing research by
Singh et al. [2015] that explores the harmful behaviors that exacerbate
stigmatization. Furthermore, such research would complement existing
studies focusing on the environmental determinants of stigmatization
(e.g., social — Wiesenfeld et al., 2008; cultural — Simmons et al.,
2014; and legal — Efrat, 2006) and add to the limited literature on
recovery from business failure.
6.5 Future research on the costs of failure
The costs of failure can be tangible and intangible. Numerous studies
to date have explored the economic costs of failure [Dew et al., 2009,
McGrath, 1999] whilst others have delved into the social and personal
costs of failure [Cope, 2011, Singh et al., 2007, Jenkins et al., 2014].
However the costs of lingering [Arora and Nandkumar, 2011] and per-
sisting with an underperforming firm [DeTienne et al., 2008] are not to
be dismissed from the discussion into failure [Khelil, 2016]. Survival is
not a proxy for success anymore than discontinuance is a proxy for fail-
ure. Crutzen and Van Caillie [2008] argue that if future literature is to
have a true impact on business failure from a preventive perspective the
various research disciplines need to converge to create an integrative
framework. However we posit that the goal of future failure research
should not concern itself with preventing failure, failure is, after all a
hallmark of a vibrant economy [McGrath, 1999]. The goal of future
research should continue to explore how entrepreneurs can fail intelli-
gently [Cannon and Edmondson, 2005] and avoid artificially prolonging
underperforming firms, whilst minimising the negative fallout from a
failure experience.
6.6 Future research on passion and business failure
A topic we believe can add further nuance to future business failure
literature is passion. Passion, according to Cardon et al. [2013] is at
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the heart of entrepreneurship. Not only because it can foster creativity
essential to the discovery and exploitation of new opportunities but it
also encourages persistence and adaptation to be successful even amidst
obstacles [Cardon and Kirk, 2015, Baron, 2008]. When failure occurs
passion can be a powerful emotion; it may sustain the entrepreneur
and motivate them to either continue persisting in the face of failure or
channel their passion into new initiatives in order to realise their goals.
Entrepreneurs often form strong bonds and express identification with
their firms to the extent that they refer to them as their “babies”
[Cardon et al., 2005]. Passion is defined as “a strong inclination toward
a self-defining activity that people like (or even love), find important,
and in which they invest time and energy on a regular basis” [Vallerand,
2012, p. 1]. Traditionally passion is regarded as a positive emotion,
however its duality can be traced back to its inception whereby passion
is derived from the Latin word passio, meaning suffering.
Entrepreneurial passion remains unexplored in the business
failure context, however its importance has not gone unnoticed. A
seminal paper by Cardon et al. [2005] exploring metaphors discussed
entrepreneurial passion during the onset of business failure; the image
of a terrorist was given, where the end justifies the means, they are
willing to sacrifice everything, even their wellbeing, for the cause, i.e.
prolonging the firm. Such an attitude reflects the fact that individuals
are more hesitant to give up affect-filled rather than affect-free goods
[Zellweger and Astrachan, 2008, Meyer et al., 1993]; therefore a
strong level of attachment can impact an entrepreneur’s behaviors.
Attachments are common for entrepreneurs to develop in projects
they passionately believe in, however if such projects suffer setbacks
this is felt as an emotional blow [Royer, 2003, Shepherd and Kuratko,
2009]. Exploring the dualistic nature of passion further Vallerand
et al. [2003] proposed the dualistic approach to passion, encompassing
both harmonious and obsessive passion to illustrate the opposing
characterizations of the way an activity is internalized into one’s
identity. More research on this dualistic approach is needed within
the entrepreneurship literature [Murnieks et al., 2014]. Thorgren and
Wincent [2015, p. 224] have discussed the need for research that
examines the pressures that lead to contingencies being attached
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to entrepreneurship, as they believe this will “explain differences
between harmonious and obsessive passion”. We argue that business
failure is a prime context within which to explore the various facets
of entrepreneurial passion as the contingencies an individual attaches
to entrepreneurship become evident when the failure process begins.
Insights into passion and its impact on entrepreneurs’ behaviors
during and after the failure process have the potential to offer new
and exciting insights into both failure and passion.
Finally, the more we understand the different aspects of entre-
preneurial business failure the greater entrepreneurs, business and
society can benefit in terms of education, legislative environment and
social supports. Researching failure is challenging with respect to
data collection however a plurality of methodological approaches is
necessary to further advance our understanding of the entrepreneurial
failure experience. Further studies may also contribute by providing
evidence for use in curriculum development and supporting the
potential growth of courses within entrepreneurship programs specif-
ically focused on business failure. An increasing body of research
benefits supporting institutions and actors by equipping them with
the knowledge needed to adequately advice, direct and advocate for
nascent and pre-nascent entrepreneurs. More fundamentally further
studies on entrepreneurial business failure can provide insights into
other categories of entrepreneurs at an individual level and in doing so
provide knowledge, reassurance and solace about the different facets
of failure. Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship are vital to national
economies. Developing the field of business failure requires breadth
of theoretical approaches, openness to pluralistic methodological
approaches, empathy with entrepreneurs that have failed and an ambi-
tion to both contribute to the body of knowledge with a willingness
to disseminate findings beyond the academy.
6.7 Future research on gender and business failure
According to Robb and Watson [2012] no difference has been found in
the performance of female- and male-owned new ventures. Furthermore
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gender is considered irrelevant with regards to determining survivabil-
ity and success at closure [Headd, 2003]. However gender may still play
an important role in the entrepreneurial process. In the entrepreneurial
context masculinity is the default setting, women forging a career in
this context may be obliged to ‘oscillate’ between symbolic spaces of
masculinity and femininity [Marlow and McAdam, 2015, Bruni et al.,
2005]. Debates on entrepreneurial identities have been criticized for
being largely gender blind [Ahl and Marlow, 2012], this is an issue as
gender biases persist in many industries to this day. The technology
industry is one such example, embedded masculinity within the sector
serves to marginalize the feminine [Wajcman, 2004, Walby et al., 2009,
Marlow and McAdam, 2015]. Female technology entrepreneurs stand at
only between 5% and 15% within Europe [Walby et al., 2009, Wynar-
czyk and Marlow, 2010]; a recent study by Marlow and McAdam [2015]
suggests that women operating in this space engage in various forms of
gender-specific identity work to enhance their chances of success.
Humans’ identities are shaped, in part, by social interactions; the
actor strives to shape a coherent self-identity this is reflexively articu-
lated through social performances [Marlow and McAdam, 2015, Wat-
son, 2009]. When masculinity is expected as the norm, women adapt
their behaviors to gain legitimacy, overcome biases, and become socially
accepted in the heavily masculine context [Marlow and McAdam, 2015].
In turn, this shapes these women’s identities and can influence other
aspects of their entrepreneurial journey. Identity, and in particular self-
identity, plays an important role in the development of stigmatization
and the emergence of passion. Stigmatization occurs as part of a pro-
cess whereby an individual’s identity is denigrated (see Section 4.4.1),
whilst passion occurs when an activity is internalized as part of one’s
identity (see Section 6.6). Future research exploring the role of gender
in the development of one’s entrepreneurial identity, and the subse-
quent impact an entrepreneurial failure experience has on this identity,
would facilitate an understanding of persisting gender biases within
the entrepreneurial space. Furthermore, examining stigmatization and
passion from a gendered perspective may provide a more nuanced view
of the business failure phenomena.
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Gender may also play a role in entrepreneurial learning. Sports psy-
chology literature posits that gender influences learning style; female
athletes were found to have a greater willingness to change yet find it
harder to do so, whilst their male counterparts had a greater ability
to change [Miller et al., 2008]. Furthermore female athletes were more
inclined to doubt their abilities whilst male athletes have a tendency to
exaggerate in this respect [Miller et al., 2008]. Confidence and overconfi-
dence (previously discussed in Section 4.3) can generate entrepreneurial
resilience and may reduce the emotional costs of failure [Hayward et al.,
2010, Ucbasaran et al., 2013]. Clearly the entrepreneurship is a dif-
ferent context to competitive sports however entrepreneurial environ-
ments are generally regarded as highly competitive [Baron, 1998] and
as such some similarities in gendered approaches are possible. A meta-
study on emotional intelligence by Joseph and Newman [2010] found
that women tend to use emotion more often and in more appropri-
ate ways than men. The potential link between gender and emotion
within an entrepreneurship context may also be interesting to explore
from a passion perspective. Within the management psychology litera-
ture emotional regulation is cited as critical for recovery from business
failure and for learning from the experience [Boss and Sims Jr, 2008].
Additional, context-specific research is necessary to better understand
if the same attitudes and behaviors apply in an entrepreneurial setting.
7
Conclusions
This monograph charts the evolution of business failure from its initial
inception in accountancy and finance, through to its popularity in the
contemporary entrepreneurship literature. Failure is an omnipresent
threat for many entrepreneurs, particularly at the nascent venturing
stage; it is a topic that warrants careful consideration by entrepreneur-
ship researchers. Yet both business historians and management scholars
argue that studies to date have mainly concentrated on studying success
cases and paid relatively little attention to firm failure [Riviezzo et al.,
2015]. However, as highlighted by this review interest in the various
facets of failure is increasing, and although studies on business fail-
ure remain disparate, studies exploring key aspects of the failure phe-
nomenon are gaining momentum. In order to stop the field of business
failure research turning into a “weed patch rather than a well tended
garden” research that can facilitate a general consensus on the fun-
damentals of the failure phenomenon and resolve theoretical disputes
are needed [Pfeffer, 1993]. The fact that there are fundamental differ-
ences between theory-generated conceptualisations of business failure
(see Table 2.1) and the data-driven definitions used in practice (see
Table 2.2) is an issue that needs to be acknowledged. This monograph
257
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provides insight into the key debates that have shaped the field to date
and offers suggestions for future research streams that can facilitate
cohesive progression of research on the business failure phenomenon
within the entrepreneurship field.
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